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REFORMING AMERICAN PENAL LAW
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER*
This article develops a new code-based, comparative, and
comprehensive program for American penal law. Without this
fresh start, the discipline of American penal law will play no sig-
nificant role in the inevitable reconsideration of arational penal
legislation accumulated during the war on crime of the past two
decades.1 Already, the writing of reform is on the wall. The
American Law Institute is considering a revision of its Model
Penal Code.2 The pressure on the federal government to revise
its anachronistic, bloated, and incoherent criminal code is
mounting.3 And even Draconian drug laws, the vanguard of the
war on crime, have begun to come under attack.4
To have a voice in this much-needed legislative reform,
American penal law scholarship must first reform itself. With-
out a sophisticated account of codified penal law that reflects
the variety and scope of modern penal law within and across ju-
risdictions, American penal law scholars will remain largely ir-
relevant to the making of penal law in this country, and rightly
5
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' On the concept of arational lawmaking, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Stat-
utes as Arational Punishmen4 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 689-90, 714-24 (1995).
2 Cf Symposium, The Model Penal Code Revisited, 4 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (forthcom-
ing 2000).
- See, e.g., WILIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (1999); Symposium, Toward a New Federal Criminal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 1 (1998); The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. Crim. Just. Sec., TASK
FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRimrNAL LAW (1998).
See, e.g., Alan Finder, Top New York Judge Calls for Easing Some Drug Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at B5.
See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got To Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological
and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 23 (1997); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? The Peculiar Place of
Experts in the Current Debate About Crime and Justice, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 305 (1995).
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The age of the common penal law is over. Penal law now is
made in codes by legislators, not in court opinions by judges.
To deserve a say in penal legislation, American penal law schol-
ars must become experts in penal legislation. And to have the
ear of legislators, American penal law scholars must address leg-
islators, notjudges.
The reform of American penal law will require a sustained
effort to reshape the attitudes of all those who affect and oper-
ate the various aspects of the penal system. To influence the
praxis of its subject matter, the discipline of American penal law
must make a place for itself in this effort. Scholars and teachers
of American penal law must begin to perceive themselves as par-
ticipants in the penal system itself, both by recognizing them-
selves as contributors to-rather than as mere observers of-the
making and application of penal law, and by instilling in present
and future system officials a sense of obligation to achieve and
maintain the legitimacy of their coercive actions. In other
words, the discipline of American penal law must come to see it-
self as part and parcel of its subject, the praxis of American pe-
nal law.
To prepare itself for this formidable and absolutely crucial
task, the discipline of American penal law must integrate itself
both internally and externally. This means that the discipline,
first, must shatter the artificial distinctions between its three
subdisciplines, substantive penal law ("criminal law"), proce-
dural penal law ("criminal procedure"), and prison law, and,
thus reconstructed, place itself within the larger context of law.
The subdisciplines of penal law exist in inexcusable isolation
not only from the praxis of penal law, but also from one an-
other; the discipline of penal law itself muddles along in almost
complete ignorance of other areas of law. American penal law
has yet to develop a satisfactory account of its relation to the law
of torts or contracts, or for that matter, to the law of taxation or
bankruptcy. As a result, American penal law has the least to say
about the very issues that matter most in penal lawmaking-
namely the proper role of penal law in public policy, and the
proper scope and definition of offenses within that role. Put
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another way, no theory of the special part of American penal
law currently exists.
The remainder of this article, in Part I, outlines a general
program for the reform of all aspects of the discipline of Ameri-
can penal law, including teaching, scholarship, and public serv-
ice. Part II then shows how one might begin to put that
program into action. It works out a new, integrative approach
to the analysis of American penal law, with particular emphasis
on substantive criminal law. Against the background of this
code-based, comparative, and comprehensive approach, Part III
lays out the plans for a new kind of penal law resource that
draws on the scope, flexibility, and interconnectedness of the
web medium to capture both modem penal law's enormous
breadth and complexity, while at the same time exposing its po-
tential for internal and external integration-that is, its essential
"webness."
Over the past year, I have begun putting the plans for such
a penal law web into action.6 Readers are invited to sample this
prototype as they move through the discussion in Part III. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that this illustrative version
of a penal law web captures the integration of only one aspect of
the penal law, substantive penal law ("criminal law"). To real-
ize the full integrative potential of penal law, the current model
would have to be located within a wider web of webs dedicated,
internally, to other aspects of the penal law as welias, externally,
to other areas of the law within and eventually across jurisdic-
tions, countries, and legal systems. The construction and main-
tenance of this network of webs will require a sustained
coordinated effort among a large group of legal experts.
Part IV closes by exploring the ways in which the outlined
web resource could help shape the critical attitudes of partici-
pants at all levels of the penal law system. A web, however, can
only lay the groundwork for the legitimacy critique of penal law
by collecting and categorizing data. In the long run the legiti-
macy of the most facially illegitimate of state practices, punish-




ment, can only be achieved and preserved if the integrative po-
tential of penal law is first realized and then fulfilled. Other-
wise, penal law will remain that ever-expanding morass beyond
the pale of comprehension and critique which it is today.
I. REFORMING AMERICAN PENAL LAW
The internal and external integration of American penal
law must reach every aspect of the discipline, from teaching to
scholarship to public service.
A. TEACHING
No area of the law, no mode of governance, requires legiti-
mation more urgently than the threat and actual infliction of
punishment in the name of penal law. And this process of le-
gitimation through public critique must begin in the classrooms
of our law schools. This means, first and foremost, that it is no
longer enough to teach law students to think like lawyers. In-
stead, students must be taught to think like legislators, like the
producers and not merely like the consumers of law. Only then
will they come to appreciate the systematic complexity of the
codes that lie at the foundation of modem law, and of modern
penal law in particular. Only then will they come to develop the
sense of authorship and responsibility required for that con-
tinuous critical analysis of state lawmaking which is the only pos-
sible source of legitimacy for the modern state's coercive
governance of its presumptively self-governing constituents.8
Reforming penal law teaching will also require expanding
the role of penal law in the law school curriculum. To restrict
the subject of substantive criminal law, for example, to a single
semester in the first year of study is unacceptable for two rea-
sons: first, the explosion of criminalization over the last decades
has transformed the always challenging task of covering this sub-
7 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). I prefer the
term "penal law" to the vaguer "criminal law" preciseiy because it drives home the
point that the state practice governed by this branch of law is always also about puni-
tive pain, no matter what other benefits society, or the offender herself, might derive
from it.
' Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain, in
WoRLD IN FRAGMENTS 3, 17-18 (David Ames Curtis ed. & trans., 1997).
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ject in one semester into an impossible one; second, the tradi-
tional function of the first year curriculum condemns the sub-
stance of any subject, including substantive criminal law, to
incidental significance. If the legitimacy, not to mention the
soundness, of penal law is to be achieved and assured, law
schools can no longer regard the teaching of penal law as a
means to the ill-defined and shortsighted end of teaching in-
coming students how "to think like a lawyer." Penal law, a sub-
ject central to the legitimacy of state governance, must become
more than a convenient source of hypotheticals on which be-
ginning law students can cut their adversarial teeth.
The teaching of substantive criminal law therefore should
be extended beyond a single semester of the first year. At the
very least, the course must be extended to cover two semesters,
with the first semester dedicated to the general part and the
second to the special part of criminal law. This year-long course
should then be supplemented with advanced courses and semi-
nars dedicated to specific topics in criminal law as well as to the
further exploration of issues in the general and special parts
that did not receive adequate attention in the introductory
course.
One class, for example, might be dedicated to a long ig-
nored subject, the constitutional foundations and limits of sub-
stantive criminal law. Paradoxically, while the teaching of
substantive criminal law in American law schools virtually ig-
nores constitutional law, procedural criminal law classes deal
with nothing but constitutional law. Today, a law student can
take a wide selection of courses on criminal procedure without
ever learning the first thing about the praxis of criminal proce-
dure. Instead of teaching their students about the criminal
process-mainly plea bargaining-our law schools every day
create new courses dealing with the constitutional law of yet an-
other aspect of an increasingly fictitious process culminating in
a trial by a jury of one's peers. As the United States Supreme
Court has continued to make constitutional law on this subject,
with the obligatory fall out among the lower courts, so teaching
materials on criminal procedure have evolved from a chapter in
casebooks on constitutional or criminal law into their very own
1999]
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casebooks and, most recently, into multi-volume casebooks se-
ries.9
Criminal procedure therefore must be wrested from the tit-
illating, but merely marginally relevant, context of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Once this subdiscipline of penal law has
shed its constitutional pretensions, the study of the criminal
process can be subjected to principled analysis. Currently, there
is no theory of the criminal process, apart from whatever in-
creasingly dim light general constitutional theory sheds on
some of its peripheral aspects. A non-constitutional theory of
the criminal process would integrate it into a comprehensive
approach to penal law. Such a theory, to deserve the attention
of lawmakers, must go beyond the invocation of tokens like "ad-
versariness," "convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent,"
or even "truth."0
The lack of a non-constitutional account grounding the
American criminal process became painfully obvious in a recent
federal case. In United States v. Singleton," a panel of the Tenth
Circuit discovered that the "federal criminal code" (title 18 of
9 On the current state of American criminal procedure, see Markus Dirk Dubber,
American Plea Bargains, German LayJudges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 601-05 (1997).
'0 The leading work on non-constitutional criminal procedure is still HERBERT
PACKER, THE LImsS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), which itself was an anomaly.
Since then the literature has been sparse, despite the occasional appearance of
thoughtful articles, beginning with John Griffiths' provocative critique of Packer's
useful but unambitious book. See John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A
Third 'Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE LJ. 359 (1970); see also Richard P. Adel-
stein, Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 1
(1981); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competingldeologies, 72 GEO. LJ. 185 (1983); Craig M. Bradley, Two Mod-
els of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985). Recently, non-
constitutional criminal procedure scholarship has begun a promising recovery in the
wake of the disintegration of constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence under
the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. LJ. 1153 (1998); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without
a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1991); WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Substantive Ori-
gins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393 (1995); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POUCE INVESTIGATION (2d ed. 1998); RONALD F.
WRIGHT & MARC L. MILLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIE
MATEPALS (1999).
"United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d
1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
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the U.S. Code) contained, in § 201(c) (2), a broadly defined fel-
ony of "giving, offering, or promising anything of value to a wit-
ness for or because of his testimony.' ' 12  The court then
proceeded to overturn a conviction that had been obtained
based on testimony by a witness who had been promised leni-
ency by the prosecutor in return for his testimony. 3
This panel opinion sent shock waves through the country's
criminal justice system and the national media.1 4 That system
was sure to collapse, it was said, if prosecutors no longer could
offer leniency in exchange for a guilty plea and testimony.
Quickly, these fears were allayed when the en banc court va-
cated the panel opinion on the ground that the statute "does
not apply to the United States or an Assistant United States At-
torney functioning within the official scope of the office," de-
spite the fact that the statute contains no such limitation and, in
fact, explicitly applies to "whoever."15
More noteworthy than the en banc court's conclusion, how-
ever, was its reasoning. Searching in vain for guideposts in the
barren landscape of statutory criminal procedure, the court
found itself invoking the spirit of the prosecutor as "alter ego"
of the United States, which in turn revealed itself to the appel-
late judges as an "inanimate entity, not a being," thus removing
the prosecutor-United States from the scope of "whoever" in §
201 (c) (2), which, according to the court, "connotes a being."
Singleton, of course, exposed not only the poverty of crimi-
nal procedure, but also that of substantive criminal law, not to
mention the sorry state of the so-called federal criminal code.
This, after all, should have been an easy case of substantive
criminal law. The procedural issue was merely a subsidiary, re-
medial question. The underlying issue was one of statutory in-
terpretation of a provision in the special part of a criminal code.
Unfortunately, however, American substantive criminal law has
so little to say on this issue that the court did not even recognize
2 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) (1999).
'3 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343.
"4 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Ruling Puts Leniency, a Top Tool For Prosecutors, Under
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1998, at Al.
" Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1297.
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its substantive nature. At least two substantive approaches sug-
gested themselves. First, the court might have read the statute
in light of a theory of the special part of federal criminal law.
Such a theory would identify the interests protected by federal
criminal law and then illustrate how each offense in the federal
criminal law's special part protects one of these interests. No
such theory exists. As a result, Singleton can happen any day
since the special part of American penal law is treated as a mere
grab bag of unconnected offense definitions, to be invoked at
the unreviewable discretion of prosecutors or, as in Singleton,
the reviewable discretion of defense attorneys.
Second, the court could have recognized that the applica-
tion of the statute to the prosecutor's action might trigger ajus-
tification defense, according to which the violation of the
statute might be not unlawful in light of some overriding socie-
tal interest, such as the smooth operation of the criminal justice
system or the conviction of the guilty. (Of course, the effect, if
any, of the possible justification of the prosecutor's facially
criminal conduct on the admissibility of the bribed witness's tes-
timony is another question altogether.) At any rate, the general
balancing in the context of the justification question would then
have forced the court to consider the theory of the functions of
the criminal process, which, as we just saw, does not exist. The
court, however, did not even reach this inquiry since it failed to
identify the issue as one of the prosecutor's substantive criminal
liability in the first place.
So much for the teaching of substantive and procedural
criminal law. The third subdiscipline of penal law deals with the
actual infliction of punitive pain. The infliction of punishment
is that aspect of the penal law which most urgently requires le-
gitimation, yet it is also that aspect which receives the least at-
tention in teaching and scholarship. It has attracted so little
pedagogic and scholarly attention that is has not been assigned
a name. The subject of "prison law" comes closest to addressing
the praxis of punishment infliction. 6 Despite the central im-
"The label "law of corrections" is also often used. Given the abandonment of any
attempt at rehabilitative treatment in our prisons, however, this label is anachronistic
at best, and hypocritical at worst.
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portance of imprisonment as a mode of punishment in Ameri-
can penal law, "prison law" by definition excludes a large part of
the praxis of punishment infliction, including "boot camps,"
probation and parole, mediation, reconciliation and restitution,
community service, house arrest, "intensive supervision," drug
treatment, sex offender treatment, as well as corporal penalties
such as chemical or physical castration and, of course, the inflic-
tion of capital punishment, which as the paradigmatic "execu-
tion" has evolved into a highly complex administrative ritual
beyond the reach of legal rules.
Even in this severely limited form, the law of punishment in-
fliction barely survives on the outskirts of the law school curricu-
lum and generates virtually no scholarship. As in the case of
criminal procedure, whatever attention the infliction of pun-
ishment has managed to attract has been devoted almost en-
tirely to questions of constitutional law. It has become clear,
however, that it makes no more sense to read the Constitution
as a code of prison law than it does to read it as a code of crimi-
nal procedure." It is symptomatic of the neglect of this crucial
subject that the entire second half of the Model Penal Code, the
most comprehensive and integrated treatment of what the Code
calls the law of "treatment and corrections," has been largely ig-
nored by scholars and legislatures alike.8
Once penal law has been assigned its proper place in the
guts of the law school curriculum, it must be taught using an
approach that subjects the praxis of penal law in this country to
critical analysis.
This means, first, that a class on penal law must have some-
thing to do with the praxis of penal law. Most immediately, pe-
nal law can no longer be taught as a common law subject,
almost forty years after the codification of American penal law
in the wake of the Model Penal Code. Moreover, the teaching
of penal law can no longer ignore the evermultiplying so-called
regulatory offenses, which today easily outnumber the offenses
" See HenryJ. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L.
REV. 929 (1965).
'8 Note also that the American Law Institute's Commentaries, whose influence ri-
vals that of the Code itself, cover only the first half of the Code.
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traditionally covered in a penal law class, homicide chief among
them.
Second, teachers must move beyond the mere reporting of
selected curious and curiouser quirks of penal law. The praxis
of penal law must be subjected to constant critique from the
perspective of certain principles. Law students-our nation's
future prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and legislators, law
commissioners, committee staffers-must be given the analytic
tools required for the much needed and difficult work of con-
tinuously revisiting and revising the penal law.
B. SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC SERVICE
These tools for the critical analysis of the penal law, how-
ever, must be developed before they can be passed on. This will
require the transformation of penal law scholarship into a
praxis oriented, and in this sense positivistic, discipline. Once
penal law is thus reconceived, the distinction between scholar-
ship and public service falls away and the question of the rele-
vance of penal law scholarship is resolved.
The new discipline of penal law begins and ends with
praxis. It begins with an analysis of the legal rules governing the
penal law. It continues with the internal and external critique
of the penal law. It ends with proposals for reform.
The analytic aspect of penal law scholarship, long ne-
glected, attains greater significance every day as modem penal
law continues to expand. Today the mere assembly of a list of
all criminal offenses in a given jurisdiction, not to mention the
entire United States, would constitute a major scholarly contri-
bution. Contemporary penal law scholars simply do not know
enough about the positive penal law to warrant special consid-
eration in the making of penal law. The doctrinal expertise of
today's penal law scholars tends to be of little if any practical
relevance. It often is limited to the anachronistic remnants of a
body of penal law that retains mostly historical significance, the
"common law,"19 or to a deliberately incomplete draft penal
" On the contemporary irrelevance of common penal law, see infra Part II.A.
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code published some four decades ago, the Model Penal Code."
Even within the common law and the Model Penal Code, exper-
tise clusters around the least practically significant portion, the
general part.
The analysis of the rules of penal law must take into consid-
eration their application. Still, that consideration should not
come at the expense of considering the rule itself. In fact, dis-
regarding the rule makes an important aspect of internal cri-
tique, namely the comparison of rule and application,
impossible. The other aspect of internal-or first-order-le-
gitimacy critique is consistency among rules. By contrast, in ex-
ternal-or second-order-critique, the rules themselves are
scrutinized under general principles of legitimacy. These prin-
ciples may be formal (e.g., participation) or substantive (e.g.,
privacy). Careful analysis and critique then form the basis for
proposals to reform either the rules themselves or their applica-
tion.
This Article outlines a conceptual and institutional frame-
work for the transformation of penal law. It does not attempt to
resolve the substantive question of what principle or principles
should guide the critical analysis of penal praxis. Yet one thing
is clear: to carry critical significance, these principles must be
drawn from the purposes and limits of penal law in a modern
democratic state, rather than from the murky depths of the
English common law. A slogan like "ignorantiajuris non excusat,"
for example, is an historical oddity without any contemporary
critical relevance whatsoever. The same holds for the eternally
repetitive debate about the 'Justifications" of punishment, car-
ried on under the misleading heading of punishment theory.
Such tired labels as "retributivism" or "consequentialism" pack
no legitimating punch unless they are directly rooted in some
theory about the legitimate functions and powers of the state. If
the enlightenment has taught us anything, it is that legal theory
belongs to political theory, rather than moral theory alone.
The critical analysis of penal law cannot occur in a vacuum.
As only one among many modes of governance employed by the
20 On the anachronism and limited scope of the Model Penal Code, see infra Part
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state, a full account of penal law must integrate itself into a
wider account of state governance, and of law in particular. As a
species of law, penal law must be distinguished from other
modes of governance, most importantly regulation or exercises
of the power to police.2' In addition, penal law must be distin-
guished from other legal modes of governance, including both
so-called public and private law. The relation of penal law to
other areas of law tends be discussed in abstract terms, if at all.
So one occasionally finds general explorations of the distinction
between civil penalties and criminal punishments, or between
civil and criminal law, or between torts and criminal law.
These probings, though often insightful, tend to have little
practical significance. At best, they may result in proposals for a
procedural distinction between areas of law whose substantive• 23
distinction remains unresolved•.
A more promising approach, better grounded in the posi-
tive law, might explore the obvious doctrinal points of contact
between penal law and other areas of law. To pick an elemen-
tary example, we still do not have a satisfactory account of the
relation between the central concepts in penal law and tort law,
including-in the general part of penal law-act, 24 commission
through omission,9 harm,26 voluntariness, 27  reckless-
ness, negligence, strict liability,31 causation, 3' mistake,3 rea-
21 See ERNST FREUND, THE PoucE POWER: Ptmuc POUCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS (1904); WAinAmJ. NOvAX, INTELLECrUAL ORIGINS OF THE STATE POUCE POWER:
THE COMMON LAwVISION OF AWELL-REGULATED SOCIETy (1989).
See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1996).
22 See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Crimi-
nal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1871-73 (1992).
24 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 2, 3 (1965) with MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01 (1985).
2' Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 4, 284 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.01(3).
216 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
1.02(1) (a).
27 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 2 with MODELPENAL CODE § 2.01(2).
28 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A with MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2) (a) & (b).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02 (2) (c).
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sonableness,M justification,- public and private necessity,36 self-
of387 40defense, 7 use of force in law enforcement,38 consent,39 excuse,
insanity,4' infancy,42 attempt,43 as well as (in the special part) pro-
tected interests44 and the host of torts paralleling criminal of-
fenses, such as assault,4 battery,4 6 false imprisonment 47 trespass
on land,4 8 and trespass to chattels,49 and so on and so on. At
best, a discussion of these concepts in either area of law will be
preceded by a passing preference to the distinction between
penal and tort law, which in the end does no more than sound a
note of caution not to commit the fundamental error of daring
to think that the definition of a given concept in one area might
" Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282, 283A, 283B, 283C, 284 with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2) (d).
", CompareRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 519 with MODELPENAL CODE § 2.05.
.1 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 55-57, 78 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.04.
34 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 11, 283 with MODEL PENAL CODE §§
1.13(16), 2.02(2) (d), 2.09(1).
" Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 288A, 296 with MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 3.01, 3.02.
, Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 262-263 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.02.
" Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63-76, 261 with MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 117-118 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.07.
39 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10A with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11.
40 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 288A, 296 with MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 2.04(3), 2.08, 2.09, 2.10.
, Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B with MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01.
42 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A with MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.10.
43 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 22-23 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.01.
" Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
1.02(1) (a).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1.
46 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 15 with MODEL PENAL CODE §
211.1.
a Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3.
48 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 7 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2.
49 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 9 with MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 222-
224.
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have something to do with the definition of that concept in the
other.0 Generally, however, the connection between these ob-
viously related areas of law is simply ignored.
The relationship between penal law and other areas of law
remains unarticulated even if the doctrine of penal law makes
specific reference to non-penal law. For example, the availabil-
ity of justification defenses in the penal law generally turns on
the concept of "lawfulness" in two ways.5' First, as a general
theoretical matter, to say that a facially criminal conduct is justi-
fled is simply another way of saying that it is lawful, or at least
not unlawful. So conduct that is criminal (i.e., violative of the
penal law, insofar as it violates a norm protected by the penal
law in a particular offense definition) goes unpunished because
it is not unlawful (i.e., not violative of the law generally speak-
ing, insofar as it manifested another, higher order norm, which
may or may not be codified in a provision of the penal law).
Second, particular provisions defining the conditions that
would justify a facially criminal act often explicitly invoke the
concept of lawfulness.52 For example, a consent justification is
available for the criminal infliction of bodily harm provided the
harm is a foreseeable consequence of participating "in a lawful
athletic contest or competitive sport." 3 In fact, the Model Penal
Code includes a general justification provision entitled "execu-
50 One finds this phobia not only in scholarly commentary, see, e.g., WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 7-14 (4th ed. 1971), but also in jurispru-
dence, see, e.g., People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412 (1974), and, perhaps most per-
plexingly, in model legislation. Only this fire wall between torts and penal law can
explain how the American Law Institute's drafters of a Restatement of Torts and of a
Model Penal Code could complete their work in virtual isolation.
" Similar problems of demarcation arise when the concept of lawfulness appears
elsewhere in the general part, such as in the definition of insanity, see, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01, as well as in the special part, such as in the definition of particular
offenses criminalizing various "unlawful" acts, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Does "Unlawful"
Mean "Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law,
71 B.U. L. REv. 193 (1991).
" Consider, for example, how often the Model Penal Code's justification provi-
sions rely on the concept. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(1), 2.10, 2.11(2)(b),
3.03, 3.04(1), 3.04(2)(a)(i), 3.04(2) (a) (ii) (A), 3.04(2) (a) (ii) (B), 3.04(2)(c),
3.06(1)(a), 3.06(1)(b), 3.06(3)(c), 3.06(6), 3.07(1), 3.07(4)(a), 3.07(4)(b),
3.07(5) (a), 3.09 (1985).
5 Id. § 2.11(2) (b).
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tion of public duty," which applies to conduct "required or
authorized" by various provisions outside the penal law, includ-
ing "the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer
or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the perform-
ance of his duties," "the law governing the execution of legal
process," "the law governing the armed services or the lawful
conduct of war," or, most broadly, "any other provision of law
imposing a public duty.
5 4
Yet the Model Penal Code also provides that the availability
of ajustification defense (i.e., a finding that the facially criminal
conduct was not unlawful) "does not abolish or impair any rem-
edy for such conduct which is available in any civil action."'55 In
other words, the facially criminal, yet not unlawful conduct may
turn out to be unlawful after all.
56
The discipline of penal law of course is not alone to blame
for its failure to integrate itself into the discipline of law. That
failure instead reflects the collapse of the discipline of law itself.
No attempt at a comprehensive account of American law has
emerged since the demise of the legal process school some
thirty years ago. The comprehensive, yet hardly sophisticated,
conceptualist approach associated with Langdell was ridiculed
by the legal sociologists and the legal realists.57 After World War
II the ambitious, and more sophisticated, legal process project
similarly fell victim to attacks on the autonomy of law by resur-
rected and radicalized legal sociology ("law and society") and
legal realism ("critical legal studies"), and eventually and most
persistently applied economics ("law and economics").- s
' Id. § 3.03.
Id. § 3.10.
° Id. §§ 3.01(2), 3.10.
17 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REv. 457 (1897); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Review of Langdell, Summary of Contracts, 14
AM. L. REv. 233 (1880); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605
(1908); Roscoe Pound, The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence, 31 ABA REP. 911
(1907).
MARKKELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 186-212, 242-68 (1987); Rob-
ert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Autonomy of Law in Law and Economics, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1997). This
is not to say, of course, that these critiques of the once dominant legal process school
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Stripped of its last remaining scientific pretensions, law today
survives no longer as an autonomous subject discipline, but as
the object phenomenon studied by other disciplines.
Without a general account of law as a mode of state govern-
ance, rather than as social or moral or economic datum, penal
law cannot be integrated into such an account.
The formidable foundational task of constructing such a
general account of law might be approached from the prag-
matic perspective of codification. Codification suggests itself as
the basis of a new comprehensive account of law for at least
three reasons. First, after the momentous codification debates
of the nineteenth century, the code is not only the desired but
in most cases also the actual form of contemporary law. In
other words, codification suggests itself as a promising frame-
work for research because it is, formally speaking, the smallest
common denominator of all branches of modern law.
Second, and more specifically, codification promotes the in-
tegration of law. The history of law both in the United States
and elsewhere makes it plain that the enterprise of codifica-
tion-the systematic, accessible, and public statement of the
rules governing a given area of law-is crucial for the internal
and external integration of modem law. It is no surprise that a
codification project, the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, generated the most integrated and comprehensive system
of penal law in the United States.59
Codification promotes integration in various ways. It crys-
tallizes possible connections. To return to the example of the
distinction between penal law and tort law, any attempt to codify
the definition of a given concept in one area would have to con-
sult the definition of that concept in the other, and vice versa.
Any discrepancies would have to be justified in light of different
functions performed by the two modes of legal governance.
were limited to its assumptions regarding the autonomy of law. As a pragmatic ap-
proach to policymaking, legal process instead suffered from a failure to investigate its
underlying assumptions generally speaking.
" See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 594,
594 (1963).
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Codification also preserves long-term integration. A sys-
tematic code will force the lawmaker to integrate amendments
into its existing structure. Insofar as that structure is clearly
connected to the underlying functions of the state in general,
and of an area of law in particular, the code thereby frames de-
bates about the propriety and legitimacy of future legislation.
Finally, and most importantly, codification focuses attention
on the praxis of law. A code that addresses irrelevant topics is
useless at best and confusing at worst. So is a code that ad-
dresses relevant topics in such a way that it fails to guide the ac-
tions of its official and non-official audience. To study law from
the perspective of codification is to study law from the perspec-
tive of the legislator, the maker of law. A code-based approach
to law therefore facilitates the transition from critical analysis to
reform, from theoretical irrelevance to practical political im-
pact.
This final step from scholarship to public service is crucial if
the discipline of American penal law is to play a role in the re-
form of its subject matter. Once the discipline has reformed it-
self as proposed and has begun to accumulate practically
significant expert knowledge, it must find ways to translate that
knowledge into law, thus reforming rather than simply observ-
ing its subject matter.
The outlined conceptual transformation of American penal
law into a practical discipline will not be achieved without an
accompanying institutional transformation. I already have
touched on the changes in the law school curriculum that must
accompany the proposed reform in the teaching of penal law.
The reform of American penal law scholarship must be similarly
facilitated by institutional innovation. Once the enormity and
complexity of the task facing a modem discipline of penal law
has been recognized, it becomes clear that nothing short of a
coordinated effort by the community of penal law scholars will
suffice to do justice to this subject which goes to the core of the
legitimacy of state coercion in the name of law. And even if the
isolated and sporadic exploration of certain topics would ad-
vance penal law in one way or another-if the enormity of the
scholarly task alone would not require coordination-the trans-
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lation of these scholarly advances into political action would be
impossible without consolidating the voices of individual schol-
ars into organizations and groups of various scopes and objec-
tives.
The scholarly coordination of the discipline requires new
resources and fora for focused and sustained exchange. This
article, in Part III, describes a new kind of web-based resource
designed as a framework for the teaching, study, practice, and,
eventually, reform of penal law. This law web exposes the con-
nections within and among legal subdisciplines and disciplines
without sacrificing their integrity. This interconnectivity is
complemented by a flexibility far beyond that of the print me-
dium, so that the law web can easily be updated and adapted to
the needs of a particular user, thus tightening its connection to
the praxis of penal law. In the end, the penal law web would
consist of various subwebs, created and maintained by experts in
a particular jurisdictional or doctrinal component of penal law.
Eventually, the penal law web itself would then be integrated
into a series of higher order law webs dedicated to the entire
law system of a particular jurisdiction or to penal law in various
jurisdictions.
Supplementing this new type of penal law resource, new
fora for focused and sustained scholarly exchange would in-
clude faculty-edited journals with various topical scopes, ranging
from specialty journals covering specific legal disciplines, such
as penal law, to general journals covering issues of general in-
terest across legal disciplines andjurisdictions. 60 These journals
would join existing fora for scholarly exchange, such as the re-
cently launched e-mail discussion group for criminal law profes-
sors 6 1 and an electronic abstract service for working papers and
forthcoming publications,62 to facilitate the development of a
6 Some journals of this kind, with widely varying missions, have begun to emerge
in recent years. See, e.g., BuFF. CRiM. L. REv. (launched in 1997); CRIME, HISrOIRE &
SoCItIS/CIm E, HISTORY & SOCITmS (same); PuNISHMEENT & Soc'y (1998); see also
FED. SENTENCING REP. (1988).
61 See CRIMPROF, <crimprof@chicagokent.kentlaw.edu> (Stephen Sowle ed.)
(launched in 1995).
62 See Criminal Law and Procedure Abstracts, <criminal-law@publishers.ssm.com>
(Dan Kahan & Paul Robinson eds.) (launched in 1996).
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discipline of penal law by fostering a continuous dialogue
among penal law scholars at a high level of sophistication. As
the slumber of American penal law since the heady, but brief,
period of pragmatic collaboration resulting in the completion
of the Model Penal Code in 1962 makes clear, no discipline can
hope to make progress if its contributions are limited to spo-
radic publications injournals edited by and for non-experts.
The written exchange in these new specialty journals must
be complemented by oral exchange in specialty conferences,
dedicated to specific, praxis-oriented topics. The contributions
to these conferences could then be published in the new spe-
cialty journals, as well as in another currently underdeveloped
forum for disciplinary development, monograph series dedi-
cated to penal law.63 Rather than compose mammoth journal
articles, the vast bulk of which provides background informa-
tion to the non-expert editors and non-expert audiences of to-
day's journals, penal law scholars would be better off writing in-
depth monographs on specific topics in penal law. At the same
time, the potential impact of books addressed at the general,
non-academic, public should not be underestimated. Since the
non-academic public pays no attention to articles, the current
practice of writing articles for non-expert academics thus man-
ages to address neither the relevant academic nor the non-
academic audience, thus condemning the discipline of penal
law to both scholarly stagnation and political insignificance.
To publish sophisticated monographs on penal law, how-
ever, one must first train scholars capable of writing them. The
embryonic state not only of American penal law practice, but
also of American penal law scholarship, is largely a function of
the cursory treatment the subject receives in our law schools.
The proposed reform of the law school curriculum therefore
would take a first step toward elevating the quality of the disci-
pline.6 In addition, advanced degree programs in criminal law
f'3 The few existing monograph series tend to mix legal with policy analysis. See,
e.g., OXFORD MONOGRAPHS ON CRIMNAL LAw AND JusTcE (Oxford Univ.); OXFORD
STUDIES IN CRIME AND PUBIC POICY (Oxford Univ.); STUDIES IN CRIME & JUSTICE
(Univ. of Chicago).
' See supra Part 1.A.
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must be created, as they already exist in dozens of other disci-
plines.65
So much for the institutional and organizational framework
necessary to promote scholarly coordination. Once scholarly
coordination has yielded scholarly achievements, political coor-
dination will be needed to translate these achievements into
praxis. This means the organizational consolidation of penal
law scholars, ranging in scope and function from a general
American Society for Penal Law, open to all penal law scholars,
to working groups dedicated to the drafting of a new provision
for one penal code or another.r These groups would vary not
only in scope and function, but also in permanence. The Soci-
ety for Penal Law could function as the permanent institutional
framework for the assembly of smaller groups, which may ad-
dress topics of short or long term relevance.
The ultimately political and practical nature of the re-
formed discipline of penal law will help protect it against the
dangers of over-specialization, which has afflicted so many
highly developed penal law systems, such as the German science
of penal law (Strafrechtswissenschaft), which continues to exert
great influence in civil law countries throughout the world. To
achieve and retain practical significance, American penal law
scholarship must always also address its non-expert audience,
from the non-expert voter, to the non-expert legislator, and,
Currently, very few U.S. law schools offer general LL.M. programs with a concen-
tration in penal law-the University of San Diego is one example. Only one law
school, the State University of New York at Buffalo, offers a specialized advanced de-
gree in criminal law.
" See, for example, the group of German criminal law scholars who regularly
meet, supported by a private foundation, to draft reform proposals, ranging in scope
from an entire new penal code to, most recently, a provision on victim-offender me-
diation. ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF WIEDERGUTMAcHUNG: ENTWURF EINES ARBEITSKREISES
DEUTSCHER, 6STERREIcHISCHER UND SCHWEIZERISCHER STRAFRECHrSLEHRER (Jfirgen
Baumann ed., 1992) (draft proposal for partial reform of the German Penal Code
with commentaries).
67 In addition to contributing to the political coordination of American penal law
scholarship-that is, the transformation of scholarship into public service-the pro-
posed Society for Penal Law could also help coordinate penal law scholarship by per-
forming some of the functions outlined above, by publishing a specialty faculty-edited
journal (a Review of American Penal Law) and by hosting conferences on penal law
topics.
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most importantly, the non-expert juror. Unlike its hypertro-
phied German counterpart, the American discipline of penal
law does not enjoy the dubious luxury of addressing itself to ex-
pert professional judges who justify their verdict in often elabo-
rate written opinions. Despite the practical insignificance of
jury trials in our current plea bargaining system, the jury there-
fore may retain an important function by symbolizing the cru-
cial importance of communicating acquired expert knowledge:
any theory of American penal law is only as good as its jury in-
structions.
Having outlined a program for the comprehensive trans-
formation of American penal law into an integrated practical
discipline, it is now time to show in greater detail how one
might go about filling in the sketch. The following part, Part II,
narrows the focus to one of the three aspects of penal law-sub-
stantive criminal law. Part III then outlines a new kind of com-
prehensive resource, a penal law web, whose integrative and
transformative impact on the discipline as well as the praxis of
penal law is explored in Part IV.
II. A NEW INTEGRATED APPROACH TO AMERICAN PENAL LAW
A. CODE-BASED
Decades after the wave of codification set in motion by the
Model Penal Code project (1953 to 1962), American penal law
is still conceived of largely as a common law subject. The case-
book remains the most commonly used instructional tool, al-
though it must be admitted that the criminal law casebook has
become something of a misnomer as no casebook today does
without statutory materials. These penal code sections (or parts
thereof), however, appear much like statutory provisions in
common law opinions, usually inserted in passing, tucked in
safely between more extended discussions of more authoritative
court opinions. Code snippets, in other words, join newspaper
clippings and necessarily truncated excerpts from scholarly
pronouncements through the ages to enliven the otherwise
rather relentless procession of statements of fact and conclu-
sions of law composed by appellate judges who found them-
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selves confronted with the extraordinary case that requires an
extended trip to the library in chambers and inevitably finds
expression in a carefully reasoned opinion befitting their judi-
cial erudition and temperament.
It is high time for the penal code to be placed at the center,
rather than at the periphery, of the study and teaching of penal
law. In particular, teaching materials must do more than simply
increase the proportion of statutory provisions to court opin-
ions; they must attempt to expose the systematic unity of a given
body of penal law, or lack thereof, by preserving the integrity of
the code at its foundation. Complaints about the shortcomings
of American criminal law scholarship, practice, and legislation
are as old as American criminal law itself. This should surprise
no one who considers the way in which American criminal law
continues to be taught. Few students will muster much intellec-
tual or moral respect for a subject presented as a hodgepodge
of rulings and rules from various jurisdictions at various times in
the history of the United States and its fellow common law
countries (mostly England of course).
The cross-temporal and crossjurisdictional sweep of Ameri-
can criminal law casebooks is nothing short of breathtaking.
There one might find the nineteenth century lucubrations of an
Oklahoma judge pro tem next to the 1960s riffs of a California
appellate court. As a result, one might learn that indeed Arkan-
sas courts in the 1920s took a different approach to the law of
rape in a case involving a black defendant and a white woman
than did, say, the New York Court of Appeals might in a 1990
case of statutory rape involving a 13-year-old victim and a 12-
year-old defendant. Intrajurisdictional inconsistencies abound
in any area of law; there is no reason to expect that crossing
state borders will alleviate the inconsistencies.
Combining these interjurisdictional differences with in-
tertemporal ones creates a cornucopia of rules that might
amuse the perennial Legal Realist; as a teaching tool, this com-
bination has a usefulness that is as merely preliminary as the
significance of Legal Realism in the history of American law:
once the point that legal rules are sensitive to time and place
has been made, it is time to move on and familiarize oneself
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with the body of law that is the object of one's study or, perhaps,
even concern.
And the backbone of the body of modern penal law is the
penal code. In the wake of the Model Penal Code, American
penal codes-with some exceptions, most notably Title 18 of the
United States Code, the so-called Federal Criminal Code-were
revised or at least reconsidered in an attempt to -provide the pe-
nal law, the state's most intrusive means of interfering with the
life plans of its constituents, with a principled foundation.
Some codes were more successful than others. Even the Model
Penal Code is open to critique. The point is that a critical
analysis of American penal law presumes an intimate familiarity
with the state-as-lawmaker's most concerted effort to legitimize
the exercise of its awesome punitive power. A teacher and
scholar who merely points out the obvious inconsistencies in
American penal law across time and space shoots fish in a bar-
rel, which may prove entertaining to one's audience (and re-
quires little preparation), but provides no long-term intellectual
gratification for either student or teacher. It also does nothing
to improve the much bemoaned quality of penal law in this
country. The monopoly of law schools over legal education is
secured and the influence of lawyers on all branches of gov-
ernment unchallenged; this means that the quality of American
penal law is largely determined by those who at one point had
to sit through at least one semester of a law school class on
"criminal law."
Considering the variety of sources of legal rules across space
and time that one finds in today's criminal law casebooks, it
might be useful to think of these materials as comparative law or
legal history casebooks. Both comparative law and legal history
are, of course, interesting and worthwhile subjects. It is not
clear, however, why the traditional course on criminal law should
be devoted primarily to their study. This arrangement would be
more sensible if it were intentional, or at least knowing. There
is nothing wrong with teaching criminal law from a comparative
or historical perspective. As any serious student of comparative
law or legal history knows, however, cross-jurisdictional and
cross-temporal comparison is easy to do, but hard to do well.
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Anyone can marvel, with little effort, at the multitude of law
across space and time. To understand, or even to describe, not
to mention to judge, across the jurisdictional or historical di-
vide, however, takes more than a breezy romp through a mish-
mash of court opinions from here and there, and now and then.
There is one view of the law, of course, that would find no
flaw in the accumulation ofjudicial opinions with no regard for
the complications (as opposed to the mere existence) of spatial
and temporal difference. It is the view to which the adulators of
the Common Law have subscribed for centuries, namely that
time and space lose their relevance in the Common Law's world
of timeless and spaceless Reason. The grand ventriloquist Rea-
son may speak at one moment through an English Lord in the
eighteenth century, at another through a Nevada trial judge two
centuries later. The voice of Reason is the same, no matter
when or where it makes itself heard. This view of the law, one
may safely assume, has been placed on the garbage heap of legal
history. It is particularly odd, therefore, to see it at the bottom
of so much modem-sounding sensitivity to the influence of time
and space upon the penal law.
B. COMPARATIVE
If the common-law-as-reason-eternal-and-universal cannot
justify the random collection ofjudicial opinions, only the com-
parative-historical approach to penal law remains as a possible
explanation, though of course not as ajustification, since no un-
intentional assembly can be justified. Penal law teaching mate-
rials should consciously adopt and develop this approach, with a
particular emphasis on the comparative analysis of penal norms
across space and, to a lesser degree, across time. This compara-
tive approach would complement the code-based approach out-
lined above in several ways. First, the study and teaching of
American penal law, as opposed to the penal law of a given
state, simply must be comparative. Penal law in the United
States still is primarily state law. This is so not only because the
majority of criminal cases are, in fact, processed by the criminal
justice systems of the various states, but also because there is no
federal criminal code to speak of. As will be discussed in greater
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detail below, the condition of the federal criminal code today
resembles that of state penal codes prior to their reform in the
wake of the completion of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code some four decades ago.6
Not only is there no legislatively created national penal
code; the judicial branch of the federal government has proved
no more interested in the subject of substantive penal law than
has its legislative branch (thus leaving the executive largely to its
own devises, with predictable results). Unlike in the area of
criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has made no effort to
create a uniform code of substantive criminal law by judicial
lawmaking. Finally, no commentator or group of commentators
has managed to create and sustain a consistent, systematic, and
comprehensive body of national penal law scholarship on the
basis of which the study and teaching of penal law could pro-
ceed. The American Law Institute's official Model Penal Code
commentaries, combined with the detailed provisions of the
Model Penal Code itself, have most closely approximated such
an authoritative account.69 That project, however, was aban-
doned in the late 1970s and suffered from the inherent limita-
tions of an officially sanctioned statement of the Code drafters'
motivations. Even a more critical analysis of the Model Penal
Code's provisions, however, could not have resulted in a com-
prehensive treatment of American penal law in its entirety due
to the limitations of the Model Penal Code project itself, to be
discussed in greater detail below.
Without a unifying code, legislative or judicial, and without
a unifying body of commentary, penal law in the United States
today can only be taught in two ways: locally or comparatively.
It is astonishing to see how rarely the local approach to penal
law teaching has been adopted. Not a single basic casebook of
penal law currently devotes itself to the penal law, not to men-
tion the penal code, of a given state. Strung together by the
thin thread of a decades old Model Penal Code that no jurisdic-
' For the best introduction to federal criminal code reform, see Ronald L. Gainer,
Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 45 (1998).




tion in the United States (or elsewhere) has adopted in its en-
tirety and without significant amendments, these casebooks
stake an ill-supported claim to national significance; the teach-
ing of state penal law and of the codes upon which it is based is
left to state bar review courses and the practicing bar.
It is particularly inappropriate for the subject of penal law
to be taught with so little regard to the actual law in force today.
No other branch of law is steeped as deeply as the penal law in
reality, particularly the reality of the infliction of violence by and
upon penal norm violators. The teaching of unenacted model
provisions therefore can at best help lay the foundation for the
teaching of real penal law; its teaching at the expense of the pe-
nal law in force cannot be justified.
It is the very success of the Model Penal Code that limits its
significance as a teaching tool today. Inspired and guided by
the Model Penal Code, most American legislatures have sub-
jected their penal codes to principled reform. These often
radically revised penal codes manifest a degree of systematic co-
herence comparable to that of the Model Penal Code and are
certainly capable of providing a solid foundation for the study
and teaching of penal law. Moreover, these penal codes by now
have been interpreted by decades of jurisprudence, which sup-
plements them to form a comprehensive and stable body of
code-based penal law.
Still, all pretensions of a national American penal law aside,
it is desirable to complement the focus on local actual penal law
with a comparative approach. This is so not merely because vir-
tually every American law school nowadays has the ambition of
training its students for practice anywhere in the nation and
even abroad, ready to apply their lawyerly thinking to any set of
laws they may encounter in the national, even global, legal mar-
ketplace. The danger of fragmented parochialism in penal law
is real, not the least because the Supreme Court appears to have
come to the conclusion that the federal Constitution contains
preciously little in the way of unifying principles of penal law.
A comparative approach also has important benefits for the
study and teaching of penal law. Insofar as considered reflec-
tion on the penal law, as on any matter ofjustice, also means the
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identification of presuppositions and prejudices, nothing fur-
thers that reflection more than the recognition of alternative
approaches to a particular question. It is the comparative spec-
trum of considered judicial judgment, reflected in the give and
take of majority and dissent, that makes opinions of common
law courts far better teaching tools than those of civil law courts,
which continue to struggle with the notion that disagreement
about the proper (re)solution of a case is possible.
A comparative approach reveals, for example, the diametri-
cally opposed approaches to penal jurisdiction that underlie the
Proposed New Federal Criminal Code of 1971 and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The Proposed Code defines its reach
almost exclusively in territorial terms, finding application to any
person within that territory.70 By contrast, the Uniform Code la-
conically provides that it "applies in all places," but devotes sev-
eral lengthy sections to the scope of its personal jurisdiction.7
Underneath these jurisdictional provisions lie radically different
conceptions of punishment, one supracommunal in the tradi-
tion of enlightenment penal law, the other fiercely intracom-
munal reminiscent of pre-modern penality. The comparative
contrast thus alerts the scholar and the student to the abstract
supracommunal conception of punishment underlying every
modem American penal code, a conception so deeply in-
grained that it is sure to go unnoticed otherwise.
Another basic, but (or perhaps therefore) often unrecog-
nized, feature of American penal law emerges after even the
most cursory comparison of the general parts of, say, the Model
Penal Code and the German Penal Code. The dominance of
process over substance, of administration over legislation, of
imposition and infliction over definition, and of the executive
and judiciary over the legislative branch of government, comes
through even in the most concerted effort to exert legislative
control over the entirety of penal law, the Model Penal Code.
This procedural orientation of American substantive penal law
is reflected in its very conceptualization as divided into "offense"
7" NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A
PROPOSED NEWFEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 210-219 (1971).
71 UNIFORM CODE OF MILARYJusIcE §§ 802-805 (1950).
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elements, on the one hand, and "defenses," on the other. In
the Model Code's general and special parts, one therefore finds
an abundance of provisions governing the administration of its
provisions, including several sections that determine the
method and propriety of prosecution in a particular case,72 de-
fine, assign, and then shift the burden of proof onto the defen-
dant who asserts an affirmative defense such as a justification or
an excuse,7 and establish evidentiary presumptions.74  The
Model Penal Code article on responsibility is almost entirely
composed of purely procedural provisions.75 By contrast, the
German Penal Code addresses none of these topics.
Code-based comparison proves similarly fruitful when it is
extended beyond the boundaries of penal law. For instance, a
casual look at Article 1 ("general provisions") of the Uniform
Commercial Code reveals significant structural, formal, and
substantive parallels to the general part of a modern penal
code, such as the Model Penal Code. Like the general part of a
penal code, Article 1 features provisions pertaining to pur-
poses,76 rules of construction 7 7 and jurisdiction.78 Like the
Model Penal Code, the UCC rejects the principle of strict con-
struction in favor of an interpretation of code provisions in light
of underlying purposes.7 Yet only the UCC explicitly authorizes
agreements to vary the effects of its provisions,8° a provision that
would be unthinkable in a penal code, which is not to say, of
course, that the vast bulk of American penal law as a matter of
fact-if not of code-consists precisely in such local variations
under the name of plea bargaining.
72 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.07-.11, 2.12 (1985).
7 Id. §§ 1.12, 2.04(4), 2.08(4), 2.09(1), 2.10, 3.01-.11, 212.4(1), 212.5, 213.6,
221.2(3), 223.1(1), 223.4, 223.9, 230.3, 242.5.
71 Id. §§ 1.03(4), 1.12(5), 5.03(7), 5.06(2)-(3), 5.07, 210.2(b), 211.2, 212.4,
223.6(2), 223.7(1), 223.8, 224.5, 251.2(4), 251.4.7
- Id. §§ 4.02-.09.
71 CompareU.C.C. § 1-102 (1998) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1985).
Compare U.C.C. § 1-102 with MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02.
7" Compare U.C.C. § 1-105 ("territorial application") with MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03
("territorial applicability").
71 CompareU.C.C. § 1-102(1) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3).
S U.C.C. § 1-102 (3).
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In general, as students place themselves in the position of
legislators, the makers of penal norms in a post-common law
age, their understanding of a codificatory problem will be sig-
nificantly enhanced by the consideration of the-by now-con-
siderable variety of principled legislative approaches to virtually
any question of criminal law. Legislative approaches here are
considered principled insofar as they-unlike rules generated
by judges bound by the limits of the case or controversy before
them-manifest identifiable principles of penal law and of pe-
nal codification and apply these principles throughout the en-
tirety of the penal code and all other legislative
pronouncements relating to the state's power to punish, includ-
ing codes dealing with criminal procedure, evidence, the inflic-
tion of punishment, and lesser offenses, whether they appear in
a separate code of infractions 8' or are dispersed throughout
non-penal codes, agency regulations, and local ordinances.
C. COMPREHENSIVE
The study and teaching of penal law must adopt a compre-
hensive approach that aims to capture the enormous range and
variety of penal norms characteristic of modem penal law. Pe-
nal law, as that term is used here, refers to the entirety of law
dealing with the state's punishment of its constituents; as such,
it disregards traditional distinctions among fields of study and of
legislative activity. Penal law is considered as a unified system
composed of three aspects-definition, imposition, infliction-
all of which are governed by certain fundamental principles.
These principles serve in two ways to legitimate the state's awe-
some punitive power over the persons for whose benefit it exists
and of whom it is constituted: first, through the consistency of
any punitive state action with them, and, second, through their
consistency with the purpose or purposes of the state. It is the
primary objective of the teaching and study of penal law to fa-
cilitate the critical analysis of the first- and second-order legiti-
macy of state punishment.
8, See, e.g., GERMAN CODE OF ORDER CONTRAVENTIONS (GESETZ UBER ORDNUNG-
SVIDRIGKEITEN, OWiG); Canada Contraventions Act, P.S.C., ch. C-38.7 (1992) (Can.).
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Manifestations of the state's punishment power have,
through a gradual process of delegation guided by considera-
tions other than fidelity to the principles of legitimate punish-
ment, spread through a variety of official rules deriving from all
branches and all levels of modem government."2 In the United
States today, no collection of the penal norms of a single state
jurisdiction exists. 83 It would be foolhardy to attempt such a
compilation, if only because new norms are added constantly to
the already immeasurable array of offenses defined in penal
codes, non-penal codes, rules and regulations, county codes,
city codes, town codes, and village codes. (Merely listing all ex-
isting sources of penal norms in a given state jurisdiction proves
difficult.) At every level and branch of government, officials
have an apparently unquenchable thirst to define rules the vio-
lation of which calls for punishment of one sort or another.
The mass of penal norms is overwhelming even if one disre-
gards borderline cases and accepts the legislature's own, gener-
ally rather limited, definition of what constitutes crime or
punishment (as opposed to, say, a "civil" "violation" subject to a
"remedial" "measure"), and counts only misdemeanors and
felonies and threats of imprisonment. (This is not to say, of
course, that there are not many fines which are punitive in pur-
pose and effect.)
If it is, for all these reasons, impossible to create penal law
materials of truly comprehensive scope, one can at least adopt a
82 On this dissipation of responsibility, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Pun-
ishment, 44 BurP. L. REv. 545 (1996); see also Cover, supra note 7.
8 For an attempt to compile a list of all New York state criminal offenses see
<http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/nycriminaloffenses.htm>. Even this extensive
compilation includes only offenses promulgated by the New York State Legislature in
its consolidated and unconsolidated laws. It does not include offenses promulgated
by the legislatures of lower level governmental entities within the state (e.g., counties,
cities, towns, and villages), or the state's executive branch (including various adminis-
trative agencies, such as the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Banking Board, the
Civil Service Commission, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Eco-
nomic Development, the Department of Education, the Board of Elections, the De-
partment of Environmental Conservation, the Department of Transportation, the
Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Development, the Department of Health, the
New York State Racing and Wagering Board, the State Board of Real Property Serv-
ices, the Department of Taxation and Finance, and the Workman's Compensation
Board).
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comprehensive approach to this unwieldy subject. It is particu-
larly important that penal law materials include various exam-
ples of penal norms that are generally excluded from the scope
of the teaching and study of penal law, including norms in non-
penal codes, agency regulations, and local laws. To the extent
that they reach beyond the general part at all, traditional penal
law materials include what is vaguely thought of (a thought
rarely made explicit and never justified) as the core provisions
of the special part, mostly as illustrations of specific topics in the
general part.
As a result, traditional teaching materials fail to give the
student a sense of the enormous scope of a given legal commu-
nity's penal code, never mind the entirety of its penal law. The
only code (penal or otherwise) that one may find reproduced at
any length in any of the traditional materials is the Model Penal
Code (though even here, only the first two of the Model Penal
Code's four parts are included, sometimes in toto, sometimes
not). While the Model Penal Code's coverage of the general
part of penal law is emphatically comprehensive-codifying so
much that it may appear more like a penal law textbook than a
penal code-its special part fails to cover a wide range of penal
norms codified in modem American penal codes, not to men-
tion penal norms defined elsewhere by the state legislature, by
different branches of state government, or by subsidiary gov-
ernmental entities.
For example, the Model Penal Code does not deal with
drug offenses, a class of norms that occupies substantial por-
tions of modem penal and non-penal codes, and accounts for
much of the business of American prosecutors' offices, courts,
and prisons (the institutions of imposition and infliction of pun-
ishment, respectively) .4 Likewise, the Model Penal Code knows
nothing of RICO and the various federal and state norms it has
spawned, nor does it address such recent legislative phenomena
84 Drug offenses are mentioned only in a note appended to the special part of the
Proposed Official Draft of the Code, where the drafters remarked that "a State enact-
ing a new Penal Code may insert additional Articles dealing with special topics such
as narcotics, alcoholic beverages, gambling and offenses against tax and trade laws."
MODEL PENAL CODE 241 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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as the codification of hate crimes, computer crimes, and car-
jacking. It goes without saying that the Model Penal Code-and
the casebooks that are based upon it, however loosely-does not
deal with a single non-penal code penal norm, a group of of-
fenses that by now dwarves the "core of the penal law" so much
so that the exception of penal norms outside the penal code
proper has long swallowed the rule of penal norms within the
penal code.
Perhaps most problematic, the Model Penal Code says noth-
ing about what may be the most significant development in
American penal law since its completion in 1962: the promulga-
tion of a comprehensive set of mandatory determinate sentenc-
ing guidelines by a federal quasi-agency, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide a par-
ticularly momentous example of penal law outside the penal
code and outside the Model Penal Code in particular. Here we
have not a subject specific agency (such as the Environmental
Protection Agency) defining subject specific regulations backed
by penal threats. Here we have a sui generis administrative body
making the law of punishment for all of federal law, within the
broad limits found in the fifty titles of the U.S. Code, a wildly
unsystematic collection of thousands upon thousands of provi-
sions amassed by the federal legislature over the past two centu-
ries, complemented by thousands upon thousands of penal
regulations promulgated by the vast array of federal administra-
tive agencies that have emerged during the past century. The
legislative limits upon the Commission's power to make pun-
ishment law are broad at best with respect to both the punish-
ment appropriate for the violation of federal penal norms and
the definition of the norms themselves. The one title of the
U.S. Code explicitly dedicated to penal norms, title 18, arranges
its dramatically underinclusive collection of federal crimes in
alphabetical order, with no general provision on jurisdiction,
voluntariness, actus reus, mens rea, causation, mistake, entrap-
" However this might be defined, and it is rarely defined other than by a lazy and
unprincipled open string such as "homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, etc."-an
entirely unacceptable state of affairs if penal law teaching and scholarship is to dis-
charge its function of facilitating critical analysis of penal law's legitimacy.
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ment, duress, infancy, justification, self-defense, or inchoate of-
fenses. The only subject of penal law that has found a compre-
hensive treatment in the U.S. Code is that of the insanity
defense, 6 which Congress in 1984 saw fit to reform and codify
with considerable dispatch and specificity both as to substance
and as to process afterJohn Hinckley's acquittal by reason of in-
sanity for his botched assassination attempt on President
Reagan in 1981.
Faced with this enormous mess of crimes and punishments,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission proceeded to ignore the re-
sults of the most recent legislative revision of the body of federal
crimes. The 1948 alphabetization of crimes in title 18, "for
which the spadework was done," wrote Henry Hart in 1958, "by
the hired hands of three commercial law-book publishers, on
delegation from a congressional committee desirous of escaping
the responsibility of hiring and supervising its own staff,"7 was
replaced by a classificatory scheme of eighteen offense catego-
ries. 8 It is this scheme upon which the Guidelines are based,
not the legislative definitions of penal norms found in the U.S.
Code. Instead of merely linking punishments to legislatively de-
fined crimes, an impossible task given the calamitous state of
federal crime definitions, the Commission thus created an en-
tirely novel system of federal crimes, clustered around the
Commission's definition of certain groups of basic offense con-
duct. The legislative definitions of penal norms appear in the
Guidelines only as an appendix-literally-to facilitate the pro-
cess of linking up Guidelines categories to actual federal of-
:6 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1998).
7 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs 401,
432 n.70 (1958).
" Offenses Against the Person; Offenses Involving Property; Offenses Involving
Public Officials; Offenses Involving Drugs; Offenses Involving Criminal Enterprises
and Racketeering, Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit; Offenses Involving Prostitu-
tion, Sexual Exploitation of Minors, and Obscenity; Offenses Involving Individual
Rights; Offenses Involving the Administration of Justice; Offenses Involving Public
Safety; Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization, and Passports; Offenses In-
volving National Defense; Offenses Involving Food, Drugs, Agricultural Products, and
Odometer Laws; Offenses Involving Prisons and Correctional Facilities; Offenses In-
volving the Environment; Antitrust Offenses; Money Laundering and Monetary
Transaction Reporting; Offenses Involving Taxation; Other Offenses. UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
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fenses, which are notoriously uncategorized (except, of course,
alphabetically) .89
In constructing this new foundation for the federal law of
punishment, the Commission found it necessary also to draft
certain general provisions pertaining to the federal law of
crime. Thus one finds dispersed throughout the Guidelines
provisions on mens rea, complicity, duress, intoxication, mis-
take, consent, necessity, and inchoate crimes, all subjects cov-
ered at best cursorily in the U.S. Code."
The U.S. Code has provided the Commission with no more
guidance on punishment than it has on crime. The Code gen-
erally assumes virtually unlimited discretion on the part of the
sentencing judge. Its sentencing provisions are accordingly
sporadic and vague.9' The Code contains no general law of pun-
ishment applicable to all federal offenses. Punishment provi-
sions instead are attached to particular offense definitions, thus
suffering from the problems of inconsistency and inaccessibility
that plague the offense definitions themselves.
As a result, federal criminal law practice today largely begins
and ends with the Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines' su-
perior organization, comprehensiveness, and accessibility, com-
bined with their determinate and mandatory nature, have
turned them into a shadow code of federal penal law that
shapes actual practice while federal legislators enjoy unfettered
discretion in continuously adding offenses to the U.S. Code, se-
cure in the knowledge that ultimate responsibility for the mak-
ing of penal law rests with the Sentencing Commission. Today,
the Code definitions of penal norms, which often combine
vagueness and wordiness (the apparently only apparently incon-
9 Id. at app. A (statutory index).
"See, e.g., id. §§ 1A2, 1B1.1, 2X1.1, 2X2.1, 2X3.1, 2X4.1, 2X5.1, 2A1.4 (app. nn. 1 &
2), 3B1.2, 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.7, 5K2.9, 5K2.10, 5K2.11, 5K(2.12, 5K2.13, 8A1.2.
", On the few occasions where the Code does contain specific punishment provi-
sions, such as in the case of mandatory minimum punishment for certain drug of-
fenses, these provisions lead to sentences so patently unjust in particular cases that
the Commission has found it difficult to consider them in its attempt to draft a prin-
cipled law of punishment. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL




sistent twin virtues of legislative pronouncements in the heyday
of the common law), retain a largely ceremonial significance as
Code sections are ritually invoked-generally in mercifully
truncated form-in the indictment and, once again, at the con-
clusion of the proceedings (almost all of which by now end
without ajury trial) when the court's judgment is announced.
The general irrelevance of codified crime definitions has
resulted in a general paradigm shift from the guilt phase of a
criminal proceeding to the sentencing phase. Consequently,
even in the few federal cases that still make it before a jury, the
decisive findings of fact often occur not at the trial, but at sen-
tencing. At sentencing, however, the judge is free to consider
all "relevant conduct,"92 including, among other things, un-
charged conduct and charged conduct of which the defendant
was acquitted. The all important sentencing trial, however, is
not subject to the strict laws of evidence that govern the guilt
trial, especially in the rare guilt trial before ajury. For example,
the burden of proof at the sentencing bench trial is preponder-
ance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Ironi-
cally, it is precisely this lowering of the burden of proof from
guilt to sentencing trial that is said to justify the reconsideration
by the sentencing judge of fact findings made at the guilt trial,
either by him- or herself or, worse yet, by a jury. A fact that
could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt may still be
provable by a preponderance of the evidence, so the argument
goes, though it may of course be difficult to tell whether the de-
terminative distinction between guilt and sentencing trial is not
the different burdens of proof, but the different finders of the
facts, with judges being traditionally more conviction prone
than juries.
In light of these facts of contemporary federal penal law,
penal law materials should prominently feature the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines both because they are a new de facto federal
code of crimes and because they show the insignificance of a
federal code of crimes in a penal law system driven by the defi-
nition of punishments, not of crimes. The Sentencing Guide-
' U.S.S.G., supra note 88, § 1B1.3.
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lines, in other words, are the most glaring illustration that the
study and teaching of penal law can no longer ignore penal law
outside the core of the penal code.
Another unfortunate effect of focusing exclusively on the
core of penal law-which in fact means that the vast bulk of tra-
ditional criminal law materials (and scholarship) is dedicated to
the law of homicide-is the transformation of the penal law into
a species of administrative law, or worse, of the law of war. His-
torically, it is understandable that the distinction between capi-
tal and non-capital offenses, a distinction that eventually
became limited to that between capital and non-capital homi-
cides, would occupy the minds of the makers, appliers, and stu-
dents of penal law. It is no accident that the foundation of the
Model Penal Code, and therefore of much of modem American
penal law, should have been laid in a monumental 1937 article
on the penal law of homicide. 3 Homicides surely make for riv-
eting reading. Another pedagogic advantage of fact heavy
common law opinions may well stem from the fact that a well
spun tale of capital murder is so much less tedious to read than
the section soup that-preceded by an impatiently curt recita-
tion of what defendant A did to B-one finds in the syllogistic
exercises of courts in civil law countries.
Still, the virtually exclusive focus on serious and especially
heinously violent crime has another, less salutary, effect on the
teaching of penal law: it eventually erodes the ability of students
and teachers alike to identify with the objects of state punish-
ment. Without the basic ability and willingness to recognize the
offender as similar, punishment turns into the regulation of
nuisances and is deprived of its ethical foundation. Perceived as
the infliction of pain upon outsiders, whether these non-
insiders are conceptualized as members of another group, out-
siders simpliciter (outlaws), or simply threats to the insider com-
munity whose humanity is of merely incidental significance,
punishment no longer is subject to ethical constraints. Punish-
ment so perceived becomes an extralegal affair, subject only to
considerations of costs and benefits. Punishment so perceived
" Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. 1 &
2), 37 COLuM. L. REv. 701, 1261 (1937).
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is transformed from a species of law to a form of regulation. In
fact, one might go so far as to say that it ceases to be punish-
ment at all, insofar as punishment implies ethical condemna-
tion for assigned blame, which in turn implies blameworthiness,
that is, the ability to generate, perceive, and follow the norms of
a given ethical community."
It may well be that as a matter of fact, penal law is a mislead-
ing misnomer if applied to much of what punitive pain the state
in fact inflicts upon its constituents, either openly in the name
of punishment or behind a definitional veil in the name of civil
commitment, treatment, correction, and other euphemistic at-
tempts to escape the constraints of penal law. The mere fact,
however, that legislatures still find it necessary, at least occa-
sionally or initially, to avoid the punishment label for certain
particularly questionable exercises of punitive pain 5 suggests
that principles of penal law still enjoy some currency, if only as
rules honored in their pervasive breach.
The appreciation of these principles of penal law-which
are ultimately principles of the state-as ethical and therefore
intracommunal, however, becomes difficult if not impossible if
those who stand to derive the most immediate benefit from
their application are perceived as non-members of the students'
(and teachers') ethical community. Franz von Liszt once fa-
mously referred to the penal code as the criminal's Magna
Charta.9 A century later, principled penal codes still embody
the constraints upon the state's punitive power; the problem is
that today criminals are perceived as outsiders. As a result, the
" Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern
Penal Thought 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1998); Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering
Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment 92 MICH. L. REv. 1577, 1601-21 (1994); R.A.
Duff, Inclusion and Exclusion: Citizens, Subjects and Outlaws, in LEGAL THEORY AT THE
END OF THE MILENNiuM 241 (M.DA. Freeman ed., 1998); R.A. Duff, Law, Language
and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal Liability, 18 OXFORDJ. L GAL STUDIES 189
(1998); P.F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND REsENTMENT, AND
OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1974).
" See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (outlining the controversy
over the indefinite preventive detention of the "sexual predator," a paradigm of the
modern outlaw).
Franz von Liszt, Die deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe, in 13 ZErTSCHR!= FR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFREcHTSwiSSENScHAFT 325, 357 (1893).
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penal code's ultimately ethical principles no longer make any
sense since, by definition, they do not apply to outsiders. Thus
deprived of its basis, the penal code (or any other body of penal
law principles, such as the principles of criminal procedure es-
tablished by the Warren Court) appears as a non-sensical collec-
tion of loopholes to be exploited by outsider-outlaws-precisely
by those for whose benefit the rules of penal law were not de-
signed. To the extent that these rules retain any ethical legiti-
macy, that legitimacy derives not from their immediate
beneficiaries, but from the beneficiaries' insider representative,
the defense attorney. As defense attorneys, however, come to
be perceived as combatants in a war on crime unconstrained by
intracommunal ethical principles, their (and therefore their cli-
ents') membership in the ethical community of legislators,
judges, teachers, and students of penal law becomes increasingly
tenuous. It does not help matters, of course, that the defense
attorneys' "enemies" in the war on crime are disproportionately
represented in the legislature and on the bench.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that it is the penal
code which explicitly exculpates and-most significantly-justi-
fies the everyday violation even of norms at the very core of pe-
nal law. So, for example, it is the penal code's provision on
justification that shields the operating surgeon from liability for
assault or homicide and similarly exculpates the disciplining
parent, teacher, warden, or airline pilot.97 Rather than merely
defining "offenses" and "defenses," the penal code stakes out
and asserts the universe of norms underlying the penal law by
specifying the consequences, which range from affirmation to
condemnation, of their violation.
It is also the penal code that provides for the possibility of
exculpating the civil rights demonstrator, the conscientious ob-
jector, and all other "civil disobedients." Some thirty years ago,
the gap between students and those who stood accused of penal
norm violations seemed far easier to bridge, as some of the
greatest icons of identification that defined American society at
the time found themselves at odds with the penal law, not to
9 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1962); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney
1999).
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mention the sizable proportion of law students who found
themselves more or less openly defying state norms backed by
often considerable punitive threats, be it by participating in ille-
gal student protests, burning draft cards, or consuming illicit
drugs.
In the end, it is the penal code that justifies the state's exer-
cise of its punishment power in the first place. The legitimate
infliction of punishment itself is merely the justified violation of
a penal norm. The state's exercise of its punishment power is
itself criminal if it falls the requirements of first- and second-
level legitimacy. To characterize the penal code as the crimi-
nal's Magna Charta, therefore, is not misleading only if the
state's constituents-punishers and punished alike-view them-
selves as potential criminals, thus recognizing the identity of the
subject and the object of penal law upon which the legitimacy of
penal law, as of all modern law, ultimately rests.
To prevent the pernicious disjunction between teacher and
students, on the one hand, and offenders, on the other, penal
law materials must include less heinous norm violations, the
mere contemplation of which does not open up a gulf of differ-
ence to their perpetrator. The enormous variety and number of
penal norms defined by the modern state render it highly un-
likely that any of its constituents would have managed to refrain
entirely from penal norm violations. Upon reflection it is
doubtful that an adult resident of the United States today will
have escaped the dense net of, say, provisions covering every as-
pect of the use of public streets-whether these provisions ap-
pear in the penal code, the vehicle and traffic code, the various
rules and regulations promulgated by the various agencies
charged with the enforcement of the laws of traffic or the op-
eration of motor vehicles, or local ordinances-not to mention
penal provisions covering shoplifting, theft (or unauthorized
use) of office equipment, misrepresentation of business ex-
penses or tax liabilities, or mistreatment of pets.
III. PENAL LAW'S WEB
The new code-based, comparative, and comprehensive ap-
proach to penal law outlined in Parts I and II may well require
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the creation of a new, more powerful resource that can capture
and communicate the potential for internal and external inte-
gration of modern penal law. Part III presents such a resource,
a web of penal law. Part IV then illustrates how a penal law web
may facilitate the continuous integration, and therefore legiti-
mation, of penal law through those who contribute to its praxis
in all of its aspects, from teaching and scholarship to the mak-
ing and application of penal law norms, and including, most
importantly, the general public. 8
A. SCOPE
To remedy the limitations of existing teaching materials in
penal law, the traditional format of the casebook must be aban-
doned along with its traditional substance, cases. The book
medium, even if stretched beyond the one-thousand page
threshold, suffers from inherent limits that can no longer ac-
commodate the sprawling mass of modern penal law.
A web does not suffer from the space (and weight) limita-
tions of a casebook, or for that matter of any other book or set
of books. Since virtually anything can be included, the selection
of materials must proceed from a careful reconsideration of the
scope and shape of their subject, the penal law, as well as of the
objectives of its study and teaching. Some preliminary results of
such a reconsideration appear in Part II of this article.
Most obvious, a penal law web could take a comprehensive
view of its subject by exploiting its virtually unlimited scope to
provide its users with a sense of the enormous scope of modern
penal law. 9 For example, it might feature not only a given state
code-such as the New York Penal Law-in its entirety, but also
excerpts from other sources of penal norms in that state, such
as, moving from the general to the particular, the New York Ve-
hicle and Traffic Law, the Regulations of the New York State
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the Erie County Charter and
Administrative Code, the Buffalo City Code, and the Amherst
Town Code.
"For an illustration of many of the functions described in Part III, see Penal Law:
A Web, supra note 6.
9See supra Part II.C.
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The all-but-borderless web medium also makes room for
approaching penal law from a comparative and code-based per-
spective.'0° So a penal law web easily could provide the user with
on-line access to the penal codes of various U.S. and foreign ju-
risdictions, along with codes of criminal procedure, evidence,
and so on. Using a basic search engine, the web also could
permit the user to analyze and compare penal codes by topic or
in their entirety.101
B. FLEXIBILITY
In addition to its virtually unlimited scope, a law web has
two other useful characteristics: flexibility and interconnected-
ness. Unlike a paper casebook, which remains frozen in time
and space between editions, a law web can be altered, ex-
panded, contracted, and updated at any time. Even more im-
portantly, the flexibility of a law web permits its users to
customize it to their particular interests and needs. Users could
customize a penal law web in two ways: by choosing among its
contents and, slightly more ambitiously, by changing its con-
tents. For example, a penal law professor at a Pennsylvania law
school might decide to adapt a penal law web to revolve around
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, perhaps assigning the Model
Penal Code or the Texas Penal Code for comparison and con-
trast. Then again, perhaps she will decide to pick and choose
among on-line accessible court opinions on penal law, indexed
alphabetically, by jurisdiction, or by topic.
In a more adventurous mood, our exemplary professor may
decide that merely choosing among the various components of
the penal law web is not enough. Using basic features of any
standard web browser, she could delete, add, or alter parts of
,oo See supra Part IIA-B.
"0 Thanks to the built-in features of today's standard web browsers (e.g., Netscape
and Internet Explorer), all of the materials included in the web materials would be
fully searchable (by choosing the "find" command in the "edit" menu), download-
able, and even printable, for those who want to get their hands (rather than merely
their eyes) on at least part of the web.
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the web to fit her precise requirements. °2 She may decide that
an annotation (or an entire code) should be added, deleted, or
at least amended, that a case requires further editing, and so on
and so on. In the end, she could transform the original law web
into her very own web, which might include, among other
things, a fully annotated version of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code. And the same goes for penal law teachers in all states
(and even outside the United States), eventually generating a
penal law interweb composed of webs tailored to the penal law
of a particular jurisdiction or, at least, to the interests and in-
sights of a particular teacher. In more traditional terms, the
end result could be a national (maybe even international) web




Perhaps even more significant than a law web's flexibility
and adaptability is its interconnectedness, its very "webness," so
to speak. The various components of a penal law web could be
interconnected through a myriad of hyperlinks, allowing the
user to jump from one component to another with a simple
click of the mouse. Hyperlinks might be used in two basic ways:
first, to highlight the connections among different parts within
a single legal text (such as a penal code) and across multiple
texts, and, second, to underlay the web of primary legal texts
with a web of secondary materials, such as annotations and
commentary.
1. Pimary Web
The primary web could highlight both the unity of a penal
code within itself and the unity of the law system to which it be-
longs.
02 This could be done simply by, first, downloading the entire web or any of its
components and, second, editing the downloaded files using either the built-in edit-
ing function of the web browser or a separate web editing program.
103 See supra Part ll.B.
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a. Intracode Connections
For example, internal links within the New York Penal Law
might point the user toward the definition of a technical term,
such as "knowingly" or "deadly force," elsewhere in the same
code. The presence of a hyperlink--ordinarily marked by a
colored underline-by itself would identify the linked term or
phrase as significant for one reason or another, encouraging
students and other users to explore its significance by following
the link. Besides cross-links to relevant definitions elsewhere in
a given code, the primary internal web also would follow all im-
portant explicit cross references within a code, to another sub-
section, section, chapter, or part.
Beyond these fairly obvious cross-references, which largely
reinforce interconnections envisioned by the code drafters, the
primary web also could contain links that establish more subtle
connections within the code structure. As an illustration, con-
sider the following excerpt from section 1.02 of the Model Pe-
nal Code.
SECTION 1.02. PURPOSES; PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the
definition of offenses are: (a) to forbid and prevent conduct
that unjustifiabl and inexcusably inflicts or threatens sub-
stantial harm to individual or public interests; .... ,U,
Hyperlinks integrated into this provision-accessible by a click
of the mouse and here marked by an underline-would help il-
luminate this central provision of the Model Code, first, by clari-
fying its limited scope, and, second, by exposing its considerable
significance within that scope. Section 1.02 (1) applies only the
"provisions governing the definition of offenses," as opposed to
section 1.02(2), which applies to "the provisions governing the
sentencing and treatment of offenders." This crucial distinc-
tion, and thus the limited scope of section 1.02(1), is all too eas-
ily overlooked if there is no indication, as there is none in
traditional penal law casebooks, that the Model Code contains
parts III and IV, dealing with "treatment and correction" and
'o MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
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"organization of correction," respectively. This confusion could
simply be avoided by inserting a link connecting section
1.02(1)'s phrase "the provisions governing the definition of of-
fenses" with a list of the provisions to which it refers. The com-
pilation of this list itself is instructive as its scope is not
immediately obvious. While it would clearly include all of the
Code's special part,10 5 along with article 5106 of the general
part,0 7 and-though less obviously-articles 1 through 4 of the
general part,0 8 it probably should exclude the remaining two ar-
ticles of the general part, entitled "authorized disposition of of-
fenders" °9 and "authority of court in sentencing,""" respectively.
The remaining links could flesh out the rich significance of
section 1.02's apparently bare statement of the Code's domi-
nant preventive purpose, "to forbid and prevent conduct that
unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public." In addition to explicitly stating
prevention as its primary objective (or, more precisely, of its
special part and most of its general part), section 1.02(1) (a) en-
capsulates the Code's basic approach to penal law and its codifi-
cation.
First, we find a definition of crime: "conduct that unjustifia-
bly and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to in-
dividual or public interests.""' This definition includes the
voluntary act requirement ("conduct"), as well as the two gen-
eral levels of exculpation for a voluntary act, justification ("un-
justifiably") and excuse ("inexcusably"), followed by a general
delineation of the reach of penal law in terms both of the "indi-
vidual" and "public" "interests" it protects and the degree of
protection it accords them (by also reaching conduct that
merely "threatens," but does not actually "inflict[]" harm on
these interests, although the scope of penal law is at the same
Id. pt. II ("Definition of Specific Crimes").
'MId. art. 5 ("Inchoate Crimes").
'o Id. pt. I ("General Provisions").
Id. arts. 1-4 (entitled "Preliminary," "General Principles of Liability," "General
Principles ofJustification," and "Responsibility," respectively).
"9 Id. art. 6.
"' Id. art. 7.
...Id. § 1.02(1) (a).
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time constrained by limiting it to the prevention of "substantial
harm" to these interests) .112
Second, section 1.02(a) provides an overview of the struc-
ture of the Model Code itself (or at least, of the "provisions gov-
erning the definition of offenses" in its first two parts). So
section 1.02(a)'s definition of crime moves from the Code's
"general principles of liability" in part I, article 2 ("conduct"), to
its "general principles ofjustification" in part I, article 3 ("unjus-
tifiably") and its treatment of "responsibility" in article 4 ("inex-
cusably," though the Code does not maintain a strict separation
ofjustification and excuse), and finally to part II, the "definition
of specific offenses" (defining that conduct which "inflicts or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests,
'' n3
although the general limitation to "substantial" harm also un-
derlies the provision on de minimis infractions in part I).114
The various links embedded into section 1.02 (a) could help
to expose it as reflecting the general three-level approach to the
analysis of penal liability underlying the Code. So links might
connect the reference to "conduct" in section 1.02(1) (a) with
the Code's section on the voluntary act requirement, 5 while
"unjustifiably" in section 1.02(1) (a) may be linked to the Code's
article on "General Principles of Justification"116 and to specific
112 See id. Significantly, this definition of crime does not include a reference to
mental states (presumably to make room for absolute liability offenses), nor does it
define the general or specific nature of the interests to be protected. Section
1.02(1) (a) originally referred to "individual and public interests." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.02(1) (a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (emphasis added). The crucial
change from "and" to "or" was made shortly before the completion of the Model
Code to "eliminate an ambiguity" mentioned in the proceedings of a 1960 confer-
ence on "law and electronics." See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: OFFICIAL
DRAFt AND REVISED COMMENTS § 1.02, n.3 (1985), citing Layman E. Allen, Logic and
Law, in LAW AND ELECTRONICS: THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW ERA-A PIONEER ANALYSIS OF
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE 187-98 (Edgar A. Jones Jr. ed., 1962). In the current Sec-
tion 1.02(1) (a), there is also no mention of punishment, a term the Model Code is
careful to avoid. Throughout, the Code prefers to speak of treatment, or of correc-
tion, instead. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE pts. In & IV (Official Draft 1962) (entitled
"Treatment and Correction" and "Organization of Correction," respectively).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (a).
"1 Id. § 2.12.
,,5 Id. § 2.01.
116 Id. art. 3.
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justification defenses defined in the special part,'1 7 and "inex-
cusably" in section 1.02(1)(a) to excuse defenses both in the
Code's general and its special part,"8 and so on.
Additional examples of ways in which hyperlinks could
highlight and reinforce connections within and among the
Model Penal Code's general part and special part can easily be
generated. For instance, the provision on omission liability 9
could be linked to all omission offenses in the Code, as well as
to all other provisions addressing the question of omissions;20
the provisions on absolute liability 2' and negligence liability 22 to
all absolute liability offenses 23 and negligence offenses, respec-
tively;124 and the provision on consent's to all offense definitions
in the special part providing for a separate consent defense,
26
and so on and so on.
b. Intercode Connections
A penal law web, however, might highlight not only the
connections among various elements of a given penal code. It
could also locate a penal code within the totality of law. Again,
most obviously, explicit references in a given penal code to
other sources of legal norms could be linked, thus permitting
the user easy access to other legislative materials related to the
penal code, including, for instance, codes of criminal procedure
and of evidence, along with specific subject matter codes, such
as vehicle and traffic, environmental, and tax codes.
These explicit cross references could be complemented by
links that make the implicit explicit. For example, the New
"
7 Id. §§ 212.4, 212.5, 223.4, 230.3, 242.5.
"' Id. §§ 2.04, 2.08.11, 210.3(b), 212.4, 212.5, 213.6(1), 221.2, 223.1(3) (c), 223.9,
242.5, 3.02(2), 3.09, 4.01.
,'Id. § 2.01(1).
,20 Id. §§ 1.03, 2.07(1)(b), 2.07(3)(b), 2.07(6)(b), 220.1(3), 220.2(3), 223.3(3)-(4),
223.5, 223.8, 230.4, 230.5, 242.6(2), 242.8, 250.1(2), 250.7, 251.2(2)(g), 5.01(1),
5.01(b).
121 Id. § 2.05.
2 Id. § 2.02(2) (d).
"s Id. §§ 220.3(2), 221.2, 250.2(2), 250.5-.7, 251.2(5).
,21 Id. §§ 210.4, 211.1 (b), 220.3(1) (a).
12 Id. § 2.11.
' Id. §§ 211.1, 212.1, 223.1(3) (c), 223.9, 250.12.
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York Penal Law's general definition of "offense" as "conduct for
which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is pro-
vided by any law of this state or by any law, local law or ordi-
nance of a political subdivision of this state, or by any order,
rule, or regulation of any governmental instrumentality author-
ized by law to adopt the same"127 might contain a link to various
sources of non-penal code penal norms in NewYork State.
Similarly, the definition of a concept in a penal code could
be linked to the definition of that concept, or a related concept,
in another code or systematic digest of law. So, for example, the
definition of "negligence" in the Model Penal Code could be
linked to the definition of "negligence" in the Restatement of
Torts. 28
Most ambitious, in the special section of the penal code,
each offense definition could be linked both to every corre-
sponding offense definition elsewhere in the statutory law of the
jurisdiction-for instance, criminal provisions in tax codes-
and to every corresponding non-criminal remedy covering the
same conduct-for instance, civil provisions in tax codes as well
as civil tort or contract remedies. So every offense definition,
such as assault, in the Model Penal Code might be linked to a
tort definition in the Restatement of Torts.12 The resulting web
would clarify the currently murky relation between penal code
and non-penal code offenses as well as between penal law and
other areas of law, and thereby lay a sorely lacking foundation
for discussions about the redundancy and arbitrariness of the
current penal regime as well as the role of penal law among the
state's arsenal of modes of governance, with obvious implica-
tions for penal law reform.130
'27 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(l) (McKinney 1998).
'28 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O1 TORTS § 282
(1965). See also supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text (providing a selection of
other obvious links between the general part of the Model Penal Code and the Re-
statement of Torts).
'2 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 (entitled "Assault; Reckless Endangering;
Threats"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 13-24 (covering battery and assault).




A law.web would also not be limited to facilitating intraju-
risdictional analysis. Links across jurisdictions of course would
not serve to illustrate the (at least presumptive) unity of law
within a given jurisdiction; instead they would permit the sort of
fruitful interjurisdictional comparison discussed in Part I.B. A
network of links connecting particular provisions in one juris-
diction with those in another could be supplemented by a
search engine that would allow users to compare penal codes by
topic, side by side on a split screen. Even without such a search
engine, it would of course always be possible simply to compare
different penal codes by accessing them individually from the
penal law web's collection of fully searchable penal codes. Top-
ics for comparison could range from the broad (e.g., the entire
general part) to the specific (e.g., the definition of driving while
intoxicated). In this way it would be possible to compare on a
single screen not only the "how" of penal codification-by com-
paring, say, the specific definition of self-defense in the German
Penal Code and the Texas Penal Code-but also the "what"-by
comparing the tables of contents of various codes. Such a com-
parison would quickly reveal significant structural similarities
and differences among codes, including the placement of cer-
tain provisions within the general or the special part,1 31 the
choice of interests thought to require penal protection, along
with the definition and ordering of these interests in the special
part,"' as well as the classification of particular offenses within
" For example, inchoate offenses appear in the general part of the Model Penal
Code, but in the special part of the New York Penal Law. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE
art. 5 with N.Y. PENAL LAw arts. 100-115 (McKinney 1998).
" Whereas the special part of the French Penal Code begins with crimes against
the person, the special part of the German Penal Code and the Model Penal Code
first define crimes against the state. See C. PtN. bk. 2; §§ 80-163 StGB; MODEL PENAL
CODE art. 200 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Even within a set of provisions dedi-
cated to the protection of a particular interest, different penal codes have adopted
different ordering principles. So, many American penal codes and the French Penal
Code order crimes against the person in descending order of seriousness, while the
New York Penal Law moves from the less serious to the more serious. See MODEL
PENAL CODE art. 210 (Official Draft 1962); C. PtN. art. 211-1; N.Y. PENAL LAW arts.
120, 125 (McKinney 1998).
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the framework of protected interests33 or outside that frame-
work altogether,34 not to mention the decision whether or not
to define a particular offense, 1 5 group of offenses, lsr or class of
offenses3 7 within the penal code.
A comparative analysis of these questions may lead to the
development of a much-needed theory of the special part of
American penal law-the norms requiring penal enforcement-
and their manifestation in specific offense definitions. Such a
theory has yet to emerge as American penal law scholarship tra-
.. For example, the New York Penal Law classifies abortion as a crime against the
person whereas the Model Penal Code classifies abortion as an offense against the
family. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.40-.60 (McKinney 1998); MODEL PENAL CODE § 220-
3.
'" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-250 to -261 (West 1994) (addressing computer-
related offenses); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 156.00-.50 (McKinney 1998) (addressing of-
fenses involving computers); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994) (addressing racketeer in-
fluenced and corrupt organizations); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00-.80, 470.00-.20
(McKinney 1998) ("The Organized Crime Control Act"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-
211 to -222 (West 1994) (addressing miscellaneous offenses). The federal legislature
has found it impossible even to remain within the non-systematic, alphabetical,
framework of the special part of its penal code. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711, 2721-2725
(1994).
"" So homosexual sex is an offense in some penal codes, but not in others. See,
e.g., TEXAs PENAL CODEANN. § 21.06 (West 1994) (defining homosexual conduct).
"36 For example, offenses of drug possession and distribution occupy two entire ar-
ticles of the New York Penal Law, but appear nowhere in the German Penal Code,
which addresses narcotics (other than alcohol) only in prohibitions against intoxica-
tion in general and against intoxication while operating "any vehicle engaged in rail,
suspension rail, water or air traffic." See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220-00-.65, 221.00-.55
(McKinney 1998); §§ 315a, 323a StGB. Offenses of drug possession and distribution
in Germany are instead defined in a separate code. See GERMAN CRIMNNAL LAW: THE
CRIMINAL CODE, Tim NARcOICS LAw 211-245 (Gerold Harfst et al. eds., 1989); Gesetz
fiber den Verkehr mit Betiubungsmitteln v. 28.7.1981 (BGB1. I S.681, 1187); see also
Cornelius Nestler, Constitutional Principles, Criminal Law Principles and German Drug
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 661 (1998). NewJersey also defines offenses of drug pos-
session and distribution in a separate code. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-1 to :21-53
(West 1997) ("NewJersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act").
,s7 For example, most American penal codes include some, but not all, minor of-
fenses. Infractions, violations, and the like instead are defined in a variety of other
state codes, state regulations, and the laws promulgated by lower-level governmental
entities, including counties, cities, towns, and villages. The German Penal Code, by
contrast, deals with these offenses in a separate code, the CODE OF ORDER
CONTRAVENTIONS (GESETZ 0BER ORDNUNGSWiDRIGKErrFN, OWIG), which contents itself
with defining only a small subset of existing minor offenses and establishing general
provisions to govern the definition and application of all others. See also
CONTRAVENTIoNsAc, R.S.C., ch. 47, §§ 2-86 (1999) (Can.).
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ditionally has focused almost exclusively on the general part of
penal law, specifically as applied to the offense of homicide. It
is, however, precisely a theory of the special part that provides a
systematic framework for penal law reform, which concerns it-
self primarily with questions of what, where, and how to codify
the penal law.
2. Seconday Web
Beneath the primary web of penal norms would lie the sec-
ondary web of case annotations and commentary. The primary
materials could contain links to court opinions, grouped under
topic headings such as "absolute liability" or "causation." For
instance, the concept of causation, recognized by all modern
penal codes as a constituent element of result offenses, goes
undefined in many penal codes (including the New York Penal
Law and the German Penal Code, though not the Model Penal
Code).1m In these codes, references to the concept of causation
could be linked to a collection of court opinions defining it.
Obviously, individual provisions and parts thereof could also be
linked to court opinions interpreting them, down to the inter-
pretation of a single statutory term, such as "reckless" or "con-
sent."
The secondary web also could contain commentary on cer-
tain basic principles not treated as such in a given code. For ex-
ample, the reference to "fair warning"' in section 1.02 of the
Model Penal Code, discussed above,3 9 might be linked to com-
mentary fleshing out that principle--commentary which in turn
could be connected to annotations on the various aspects of the
fair warning principle, such as legislativity (the principle of le-
gality), specificity (the prohibition of vagueness), lenity (the
rule of strict construction or the prohibition of analogy), and
prospectivity (the prohibition of retroactivity), including rele-
vant provisions of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by lead-
ing Supreme Court cases.
"' See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03.
"' See supra Part III.C.l.a.
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In sum, the web medium makes it possible to accomplish
apparently contradictory objectives: illustrate a penal code's in-
terconnection with other primary and secondary materials
while, at the same time, maintaining its integrity as a code. As
contemporary casebooks make clear, a code quickly disinte-
grates into an unconnected collection of pronouncements on
various and sundry topics of penal law. While the Model Penal
Code's provision on attempt,140 for example, may well be prof-
itably studied on its own-especially if placed alongside the con-
fused wranglings of a nineteenth-century frontier judge
unschooled in the penal law-the true accomplishment of the
Model Code, as of any principled code, lies not in its thoughtful
resolution of particular puzzles in the doctrine of penal law, but
in the unified structure, the integrity, it manages to impose on
its scattered subject. No student will appreciate a penal code's
integrity if the code is truncated, dissected, and its segments re-
arranged for insertion somewhere in the more or less systematic
sequence of chapters in a traditional casebook.
Even currently available commentaries, though focused on
a single code, often surrender the systematic unity and
comprehensiveness of their subject code to a piecemeal analysis
of its particular components. Take, for example, the standard
commentaries on the German Penal Code, widely considered as
a masterwork of simple conceptual unity. These commentaries
have long ago broken the thousand-page barrier, with a ratio of
commentary to code so high that code provisions are largely re-
duced to sudden interruptions of the never-ending flow of small
print dissertations on penal law subjects, written by teams of
authors who may or may not share a single view of the penal
code, or for that matter of penal law in general.
In addition to placing penal codes within a web of connec-
tions while, at the same time, retaining its systematic unity, a
penal law web can achieve another set of apparently inconsis-
tent goals: focus the teaching and study of penal law on the
comprehensive reality of an actual system of penal law without
descending into blind parochialism. So an American penal law
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01.
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web might be constructed around two nodes, the Model Penal
Code-as the one penal code that can claim truly national sig-
nificance-and a significant state code, such as the New York
Penal Law.
Although any state code can be selected, the New York Pe-
nal Law recommends itself for two reasons. First, it was radically
revised five years after the completion of the Model Code, by a
commission that included Herbert Wechsler, the drafter of the
Model Code. The Penal Law follows the Model Code in many
respects, though the careful student will soon discover differ-
ences of lesser and greater significance. The Penal Law, for ex-
ample, does not codify certain topics treated, often at
considerable length, in the Model Penal Code (e.g., causa-
tion) .4I On the other hand, the Penal Law's special part is sig-
nificantly bulkier than the Model Penal Code's, both because it
includes offenses not found in the Model Penal Code (e.g.,
drug offenses, computer crimes, RICO) and because it adopted
a far greater variety of offense degrees than did the Model Penal
Code and separately defined each degree of each offense.
Second, the New York Penal Law has been subjected to
three decades of judicial interpretation. The combination of
the New York Penal Law, filled with internal hyperlinks as well
as with external hyperlinks to other relevant New York legal
texts, and a selection of trial and appellate court opinions apply-
ing the Penal Law to a multitude of factual scenarios thus would
generate a comprehensive web of a well-developed Model-Penal-
Code-based American penal law system in action.
IV. THE PENAL LAW WEB IN THE PRAXIS OF AMERICAN PENAL LAW
Now that the unique integrative potential of a penal law web
has been illustrated, let us take a quick look at how that poten-
tial can be realized by participants in the various aspects of the
praxis of penal law. The value of a law web, as of any law re-
source, lies after all in its ability not merely to display the con-
ceptual integrity of its subject, but to make that integrity a
reality.




The particular pedagogic use to which a law web is put
would depend entirely on the preferences of the teacher and
the contours of her chosen subject. Given its flexibility, a law
web could easily be adapted for a variety of courses, some more
traditional than others. Among the obvious candidates is the
traditional first-year course on "criminal law," which covers-at
least in theory-the entirety of the general and special parts of
all of American penal law in a single semester. The materials
could also be used for a-less traditional but more sensible-
two-semester first-year course, with the first semester focusing
on the general and the second semester focusing on the special
part. Other pedagogic applications of a code-based, compara-
tive, and comprehensive penal law web might include upper-
class seminars or courses in advanced penal law, which again
may be dedicated to the general or the special part or perhaps
to more specific topics in penal law, such as "The Law of Self-
Defense (or some other such topic) in Comparative Perspec-
tive," simply "The Model Penal Code" (or of course "New York
Penal Law" or "Florida Criminal Law"), or even a course on fed-
eral criminal law, federal sentencing, or on "Criminal Law in
the Supreme Court" or "Constitutional Criminal Law."
Once a penal law web has been adopted or adapted for a
particular class, it could function as a primary or as a secondary
teaching tool. As a primary teaching tool, a law web could be
projected onto a screen during class, with the teacher using a
computer with internet access to select from the law web's vari-
ous components. For example, in preparing for class she may
select code sections or court opinions to illustrate certain points
during her presentation. During class, she would also be free to
draw on the web's collection of materials to illustrate and pur-
sue an unanticipated line of inquiry or to frame and address a
student question.4
14 Depending on available classroom equipment and the teacher's preference,
students could either observe the teacher as she moves around the law web or access
the law web themselves by using portable or built-in computers with internet access,
already available at many law schools throughout the country.
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In this way, a law web would give the teacher immediate ac-
cess to an extensive library of penal law materials before, dur-
ing, and after class, a library that her students can visit and
revisit at any time. Moreover, unlike a paper library or even a
collection of slides or overheads, materials in a law web are not
static and do not require extensive pre-class preparation, thus
supporting rather than constraining the teacher's pedagogic
creativity in the act of teaching. Perhaps most important, the
components of a law web are interconnected, thus allowing the
teacher to demonstrate her thought processes throughout the
class as her students follow her as she pursues links among the
various materials in the primary and secondary webs, regardless
of whether she is lecturing or engaging students in a pedagogic
give-and-take. As a result, she can communicate to the students
not merely a set of rules, but also their interconnectedness in a
system.
As a primary teaching tool, a penal law web would replace
the traditional casebook.14 3 Alternatively, a penal law web could
be used as a supplementary teaching tool. For example, stu-
dents might access the law web at their convenience from home
or at school to prepare for class or to deepen their understand-
ing of a particular topic. As students discover and follow the
links embedded in the law web, they may come to appreciate
the systematic sophistication and enormous scope of penal law,
while remaining free to pursue their interest in a particular as-
pect of the subject, whether this is the distinction between reck-
" Depending on her interests and her approach to the subject, the penal law
teacher nonetheless may decide to have her students work with a supplement includ-
ing selected codes or code excerpts, court opinions, or secondary materials, which
may or may not be included in the law web. Some teachers may feel that, even if
there is no need to go beyond the sources collected in the law web, students will find
it difficult to work without the customary paper materials. Here it is important to
keep in mind that a law web as outlined above would use only the most basic web
technology; anyone who can surf the internet can use a law web. Moreover, already
today-and increasingly tomorrow-the web sophistication of law students matches
and, in many cases, exceeds that of their teachers.
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lessness and negligence in the North Dakota Criminal Code4 4
or the definition of genocide in the French Code P6nal.'4
B. SCHOLARSHIP
The use of a code-based, comparative penal law web to any
scholar exploring a comparative approach to penal law, domes-
tically or internationally, is apparent. A law web that would at-
tempt to capture the tremendous variety and scope of modern
penal law within a given jurisdiction may encourage even the
scholar whose research interest is confined to a single jurisdic-
tion to expand her inquiry beyond the traditional heartland of
American penal law-the general part as applied to the law of
homicide-to the continuously expanding mass of so-called
regulatory offenses.
The comparative study of codes across areas of law and even
across jurisdictions may lead to the rediscovery of a general sci-
ence of codification, which had briefly emerged in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and found its most
enthusiastic and prolific exponent and practitioner in Jeremy
Bentham.46 Code drafters, no matter what their jurisdiction or
their subject, face similar questions of why, what, where, and
how to codify, though these questions may of course find differ-
ent answers from system to system, and from code to code, as
the comparative analysis of the general parts of the Model Penal
Code and the Uniform Commercial Code above has shown. 47
C. LAWMAKING
The comprehensive interconnectedness of a penal law web
within a given jurisdiction could guide representative lawmakers
in deciding"-as they must often decide-whether (and, if so,
how) the penal law might be employed to deal with a particular
'" Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(c) (1997) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
02-02(1) (d).
,4 C. PtN. art. 211-1.
46 SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION (1789); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (1802); see also 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 390-524
(John Bowring ed., 1842).
"17 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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policy matter. For instance, by providing a comprehensive
overview of the entirety of a jurisdiction's penal provisions and
by interconnecting penal code provisions addressing related
topics, a law web might help to stem the recent tide of ara-
tional-haphazard, duplicative, inconsistent, and generally un-
systematic-penal lawmaking. Such an overview alone may give
lawmakers pause before continuing the current trend of whole-
sale and undifferentiated penalization.
Similarly, lawmakers might use a penal law web's selection
of American and international penal codes, supplemented by a
search engine for the comparison of penal codes by topic, to
gain an overview of the approaches that other jurisdictions have
taken to general and specific issues of penal codification, rang-
ing from the scope and structure of a penal code to the formu-
lation of a particular provision. In this way, a penal law web
would dramatically simplify the enormous comparative task fac-
ing any American lawmaker unwilling or unable to reinvent the
wheel in parochial isolation.1
8
D. LAWAPPLYING
Not only legislators and their various aides and consultants
(including legislative staffers and members of law revision
commissions), but also other participants in the various aspects
of the American penal system may turn to a penal law web as a
systematic collection of penal norms, supplemented by the
workhorse of American legal practice, "precedent." Most im-
mediately, a penal law web should be of use to those who work
with any of the law web's penal codes that have been annotated
by internal and external hyperlinks. Using links embedded in
such a code, the practicing lawyer or judge may be able to rec-
"4' For example, a massive 16-volume treatment of all major penal law subjects
from a domestic and comparative perspective was compiled in connection with the
(unsuccessful) attempt to reform the German Penal Code at the beginning of this
century. VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN UND AUSLANDISCHEN
STRAFRECHTS: VORARBE1TEN ZUR DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTSREFORM (Karl Birkmeyer et al.
eds., 1908). Examples from the United States include the three volumes of prepara-
tory research published by the federal criminal code commission, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS (1970), and of
course the six volumes of commentaries on the Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL
CODE AND COMMENTARIES (1985).
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ognize systematic connections among provisions within the Pe-
nal Law as well as among the Penal Law and other related
codes, such as the Vehicle and Traffic Law or the Criminal Pro-
cedure Law. This greater appreciation of the systematic context
of a given provision may permit her to develop a more sophisti-
cated analysis of a given case or controversy, which may ulti-
mately result in a more consistent body of penal jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The principled reform of the American penal law system af-
ter the war on crime will be possible only if official and non-
official participants in the system come to regard state punish-
ment as a system of rules and practices that can and must be in-
tegrated within itself and within the wider system of state
governance in the name of law. A penal law web may facilitate
this process of integration.
In the long run, however, the legitimacy of American penal
law can only be achieved if the penal law is brought home to its
ultimate object-subjects, the very citizens who constitute the
state that threatens and eventually inflicts punitive pain upon
them in the name of penal law. In fact, the legitimacy of
American penal law will only be guaranteed if the distinction
between official and non-official participants in the communal
praxis of punishment is discarded, that is, if all members of the
American political community recognize the state's penal law as
their penal law.
49
As a publicly accessible resource, a penal law web would en-
able this long-term legitimation of American penal law by cut-
ting through the layers of official system participants whose
expert knowledge threatens to insulate the penal law from the
constant public critical analysis it must undergo to achieve and
retain legitimacy. No matter what their objective, preventive or
retributive, penal norms may not be addressed merely to a spe-
cially trained subgroup of the state's constituents. The same
holds for the basic principles of their definition, imposition,




and infliction. Otherwise, the infliction of pain in the name of
punishment becomes an alegitimate manifestation of superior
power by some person against another or some group against
outsiders.
The proliferation and dispersal of penal norms far beyond
the boundaries of the penal code, their official depository, has
made public scrutiny of the state's punitive power virtually im-
possible. A penal law web could take a small step toward using a
modem medium to harness modem penal law. Spread across
the entirety of modem law as an enforcement mechanism
adaptable to any area of state regulation, penal norms can no
longer be contained within the covers of a single book, called a
penal code.
It would seem to be possible, however, to open modern pe-
nal law to continuous first- and second-order legitimacy scrutiny
by, first, systematizing it around a common core of general
principles (perhaps contained in the penal code) and, second,
exposing and tightening the precise connection between all pe-
nal norms to these core principles. Second-order (or external)
legitimacy critique thus could focus on the penal code, whereas
first-order (or internal) legitimacy scrutiny could be applied to
any penal norm defined anywhere in the vast field of modem
law.
To reform modem penal law, therefore, is to transform it
into a web. The interdependency of penal law, however, implies
the interdependency of those who shape it. Teachers and
scholars of American penal law in particular must acknowledge
their responsibility for the state of American penal law. They
must abandon their comfortable habits of engaging in idle
speculations on applied moral theory or charting doctrinal de-
velopments in the lawapplying courts. Instead they must refo-
cus their pedagogic and scholarly attention on the source of
penal law, the legislatures and their penal codes, as they had
some thirty years ago when the Model Penal Code swept the na-
dion.is
"' See, e.g., Symposium, Rethinking Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1
(1997); Symposium, Toward a New Federal Criminal Code, supra note 3. See also MAMNG
CRIMINAL LAW CLEAR ANDJUST (Donald Stuart ed., 1999) (draft proposals for compre-
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It is important to recognize that the responsibility of penal
law scholars for American penal law derives not primarily from
their status as experts. At bottom, this responsibility springs
from their status as self-governing constituents of a free state.
Along with the power to participate in the generation of law
comes the responsibility for its substance. The expert status
claimed by those who enjoy the leisure of contemplating mod-
em penal law to its full extent and complexity merely augments
that burden of responsibility for its continued legitimation
which all state constituents must carry.
Today, the Model Penal Code's legislative impact has long
subsided and American penal codes still await sustained schol-
arly analysis, either within or across jurisdictions. The much
bemoaned irrelevance of American penal law scholars or "ex-
perts" is largely self-imposed. American penal law scholarship
cannot expect to shape penal lawmaking as long as it fails to
come to grips with the fact that the power to make penal law has
for decades rested with American legislatures, not the courts.
Scholars continue to ponder the distinction between "the com-
mon law rule" and "the Model Penal Code rule" on any given
subject, long after that convenient distinction has become
meaningless in the reality of American penal law, which is de-
fined instead by the codes governing particularjurisdictions.
Experts of American penal law must integrate themselves
into the web of penal law by reforming themselves as experts of
American penal codes. Only then will they be in a position to
contribute to the reform and legitimation of penal law in a
given-their-jurisdiction and ultimately in the country as a
whole.
hensive reform of Canadian penal law with commentaries); ALThRNATIV-ENTWURF
WIEDERGUTMiACHUNG, supra note 66 (draft proposal for partial reform of the German
Penal Code with commentaries).
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